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## THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS AND ROMAN CHRISTIANITY

E. F. SCOTT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

It may be gathered not only from the tone of his admonitions but from at least one specific reference (13 19), that the author of Hebrews was himself associated with the community to which he wrote. His Epistle may therefore be accepted as evidence for the religious position of the readers, as well as of the teacher who addressed them.

The question of destination cannot be regarded by any means as settled, but the weight of critical opinion is more and more in favor of Rome. In this paper I propose to deal more especially with the theological considerations which, to my mind, bear out this hypothesis. The arguments from the literary side are familiar, and it will be enough to recall them with the briefest comment.

From the use of the Epistle by Clement not many years after the probable date of its composition, we know that the Roman church was well acquainted with it, almost from the outset. It is possible, no doubt, that copies of it had found their way to Rome from some Eastern church, but we can hardly assume that it passed so immediately into general circulation. The natural inference from Clement's use of it is certainly that it was the peculiar possession of the Roman church.

The closing salutation, *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*, implies that it was written either from or to Italy, in other words Rome; for no mere local community could thus speak for Italian Christians in general. Of the two possible interpretations of the ambiguous phrase, the more reasonable one is clearly that some little Italian colony sends greetings to the home church. This is the more probable as the author of Hebrews does not write, like Clement, in the name of the community, and it would be beyond his province to offer a general salutation. What he appears to do is simply to include the Italian friends who were with him in his greetings to an Italian church. It may be added that the comprehensive term "Italy" has a special fitness if the Epistle was sent to Rome from some distant city, where all Italian Christians would form a single group. The evidence of the salutation is of course compromised by the doubt as to whether the closing chapter is an original part of the Epistle. To my mind the case for the negative has little to stand upon. There is no visible break between any of those concluding verses and what goes before; and the very fact that the writing has no epistolary beginning is strong proof that the ending is genuine. A late editor, anxious to assimilate Hebrews to the Pauline Epistles, would not be likely to leave his work half done.

The circumstances of the church addressed, so far as we can gather them from the various allusions, all point to Rome. It is a church with a long and honorable history. Eminent teachers have labored in it, and have shown a noble example. It has distinguished itself by its liberality and many-sided beneficence. In a peculiar degree it has been exposed to persecution. Here, it is true, we meet with the gravest argument against the Roman destination, for the references to persecution are altogether too mild for a church that had suffered the terrible outrage under Nero. But it must be borne in mind that



the Epistle is addressed to the existing community, which had never been called on to endure a heroic test. Possibly there is a reminiscence of the Neronian persecution in the eulogy of bygone teachers—*ὧν ἀναθεωροῦντες τὴν ἐκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς, μιμεῖσθε τὴν πίστιν* (13 7).

It has often been pointed out that the Epistle contemplates a body of readers who were all living under the same peculiar conditions, and that it cannot therefore have been addressed to the great miscellaneous community at Rome. The argument is perfectly valid; but rightly considered, it furnishes one of the most convincing proofs of the Roman destination. The writer has in view a church within the church — a select company to whom he can address warnings and instructions of a very definite kind. An audience of this nature presupposes one of the large centres of the Christian mission, and we should look for it most naturally in Rome.

Here, however, we touch on a point which seems to me vital for the understanding of the Epistle, and which has been too generally overlooked. Not only is it clear that the writer addresses himself to a separate group within a larger community, but indications are given as to the character of this group. It consisted of mature converts — men who ought themselves to be teachers, and for whom the common instruction in the elements of the doctrine of Christ has ceased to be necessary. The church has a right to expect that they should make paths for the more ignorant to walk in (12 12), and that they should take a certain oversight of their brethren (12 14). It is significant that in his warnings to them the writer says practically nothing of the grosser sins, against which the hortatory sections of other Epistles are mainly directed. They are supposed to have outgrown those pagan immoralities and to be facing subtler temptations — apathy, self-complacency, carelessness about their progress in faith and knowledge.

It may be gathered, therefore, that Hebrews is addressed to a limited circle, called to the study of Christian truth in its higher aspects. That the *τέλειοι* formed a class apart we know from Paul's explicit statement in 1 Cor. 2; and the same fact can be inferred, with hardly less certainty, from the practice which Mark attributes to Jesus of imparting the "mystery of the Kingdom" to the inner circle of his disciples. It is quite unnecessary to conclude that in the church there was a distinction between initiates and ordinary members, as in the pagan cults. We can well understand how the division might have come about of its own accord, as a matter of practical convenience. For purposes of instruction the raw converts, to whom Christian doctrine and morality were utterly strange, would need to be taken separately from those who were more naturally gifted and had advanced to a further stage. We may assume that every community of any importance had its little circle of *τέλειοι*, to whom a teacher could speak freely on the higher matters of Christian knowledge. In a city like Rome, they may have formed a considerable group, meeting separately for religious study, under the guidance of some revered leader. I would suggest that in Hebrews we have a discourse prepared by this master for his disciples at a time when he was parted from them for a considerable period. It is not so much a letter as an address or lecture to be delivered in his name, but he takes the opportunity of adding a few personal notes and greetings at the close.

If the Epistle is thus intended for an inner group of advanced converts, a light is thrown on its real character. It aims at the deeper interpretation of the ordinary beliefs; in other words it is an example of the Gnosis which was cultivated in the primitive church. Just as Paul had a wisdom which he spoke among the *τέλειοι*, so this teacher communicates a doctrine which goes far beyond the usual instruction. He is aware that his readers will find it novel



and difficult, and doubts whether they are yet prepared for these high speculations. He approaches his main theme by careful degrees, and makes a solemn pause before he at last divulges it. In its content, as well as in the manner of its introduction, the doctrine bears all the marks of Gnosis. It is admittedly concerned with the higher world which lies beyond our senses (cf. 2 5). It takes its departure from a cryptic utterance of Scripture. The writer is conscious that he owes his insight to a special illumination, and that he can only proceed "if God permit." His teaching certainly contains nothing that is Gnostic in the later sinister sense. It does not blend Christian ideas with pagan theosophy, and makes no claim to be occult or esoteric, except in so far as it appeals only to mature, enlightened minds. But we must remember that there was a Christian Gnosis, which was not the least valued of the gifts of the Spirit. A great teacher was expected not merely to impart the accepted tradition but to throw light on its further implications, confirming faith by knowledge. Almost from the beginning this speculative activity seems to have gone hand in hand with the transmission of what had been received.

If the Epistle is to be viewed as primarily an example of Gnosis, it stands on a different footing from other early writings, and any account of its teaching must be subject to certain reservations. For one thing, we need not try to extract from it a complete system of theology. The writer's aim is to discuss one peculiar doctrine — a doctrine to which he no doubt attaches the highest importance, but which does not by any means exhaust his whole presentation of the gospel. Again, his Gnosis by its very nature is supplementary to the normal beliefs of the church. It is intended for those who desire "to press on to perfection," to explore the ultimate significance of the work of Christ. But it presupposes the whole body of belief which they already hold in common with their

Christian brethren, and which in itself is sufficient for salvation. Once more, the doctrine in question is not to be taken as in any sense representative. Attempts have often been made to construe the Epistle as the manifesto of some school or party which rested its Christianity on a belief in the priesthood of Christ. It is true that suggestions of this belief can be discovered elsewhere, but there is no indication that it was widely current, much less that any definite type of doctrine had grown out of it. The writer advances it as his own Gnosis, his new and peculiar interpretation of the work of Christ.

The more we examine the Epistle the more we realize how much is *assumed* in it, and how closely its specific teaching is bound up with those underlying assumptions. For all his boldness in speculation the writer is not an original mind in the same sense as Paul or the Fourth Evangelist. He makes no effort to grasp the Christian message as a whole, and think it over again in terms adequate to a new and profound experience. He is content to stand on the common Christian ground, and to work out the hidden implications of ideas that must be taken for granted. The significance of the Epistle resides no less in all that it presupposes than in the new doctrine which it contributes.

It has been necessary to discuss at some length the nature of the Epistle before considering its relation to Roman Christianity. That it was written to Rome by an accredited teacher of the Roman church may fairly be surmised on the ground of the literary evidence; but the peculiarities of its doctrine seem foreign, at first sight, to anything that we know of Roman thought. The difficulty, however, largely disappears when we make allowance for its specific character as a Gnosis, not a mere popular homily. When we come to examine it with this proviso, we find a number of features in its teaching which seem to have their true explanation in its Roman origin.



In the first place, it reflects a mode of thinking which diverges widely from that of Paul. Every one would now admit that the characteristic Pauline doctrines are absent, that Pauline terms are used in a totally different sense, that the interpretation of the work of Christ has hardly a point in common with Paulinism. But the tradition that this document is somehow connected with Paul is dying hard. In most handbooks of New Testament theology it is still classed vaguely as deutero-Pauline, even when the marks that differentiate it from Paul's writings are set in the clearest relief. It seems to me that the first thing necessary to any intelligent study of the Epistle is to rid our minds entirely of this Pauline obsession. A certain affinity with Paul no doubt exists, but it concerns only the larger assumptions with which the writer works. He accepts the usual apocalyptic scheme; he thinks of Christ as a divine or angelic being and lays a central emphasis on his death; he brings Christian ideas into line with contemporary speculation. But from all this it is futile to argue his dependence on Paul. We can only infer that he too was affected, on the one hand, by the primitive Christian and, on the other, by the Hellenistic tradition. The significant fact is not that the two thinkers have a few broad conceptions in common, but that they throw them into different combinations, each of them unconscious that another construction is possible. On the hypothesis that Hebrews is a product of Roman Christianity, this divergence from Paulinism is capable of an obvious explanation. The Roman church had come into being and grown to maturity apart from the Pauline influence. It had been faced with Paul's problem of adapting the gospel to Gentile conditions and needs, but had solved it in a fashion of its own, and its type of teaching had become more or less fixed before Paul's conclusions could affect it. There may have been other centres of Gentile Christianity outside of the Pauline orbit, but one at least is

known to us; and if the theology of Hebrews is roughly parallel to Paulinism but quite distinct, we have a strong presumption that it arose in the great independent church of Rome.

In Hebrews no trace can be discovered of anything that can properly be called mysticism. There is no suggestion of a union with Christ, or of a new life imparted by him to the believer. The Holy Spirit is viewed simply as the power behind the charismata, or as the source of scriptural revelation. The idea of participation in the divine nature gives way to that of access to God by means of a perfected form of worship. As the Epistle excludes the mystical element generally, so it allows no place to sacramental doctrine. The Eucharist is never even mentioned. To baptism there are several passing allusions, from which we can gather that it marks the formal transition to the Christian life. But it does not appear to be construed mystically, as the act of the new birth, or as the dying and rising with Christ. Its significance is at most that which was assigned to it in the primitive church — a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins. As in the early chapters of Acts, it is coupled with the Old Testament ordinance of the laying on of hands. How are we to account for this falling away of the mystical strain, which is elsewhere dominant in Hellenistic Christianity? Its exclusion from Hebrews is all the more remarkable when we bear in mind the relation of the Epistle to Philonic thought, which is essentially mystical. The fact may be explained partly from the writer's temperament, which responded to the Hellenistic influence on its reflective rather than on its mystical side. It may be explained also from his fidelity, in spite of Alexandrian sympathies, to the Hebraic and primitive Christian tradition. But if we may assume that he represents a Roman type of Christianity, there is yet a further explanation, for as far back as we can go the Roman church has shown itself averse to all forms of mysticism. The



Epistle of Clement takes no account whatever of those aspects of religion which were vital to Paul and the Fourth Evangelist. The *Shepherd of Hermas* may be partially modeled on the *Poimandres*, but in place of mystical speculation it offers imagery, symbolism, allegory. From the beginning the Roman church was preoccupied with moral and ecclesiastical interests, and the conception of Christianity as a new life, an inward fellowship with God, fell wholly into the background. In this connection it may be worth remarking that in Hebrews there seems to be nothing which can be related to the Oriental cults, if we except a few doubtful words (κύριος, μεσίτης, φωτισμός) belonging to the general religious vocabulary of the time. A similar aloofness from the Oriental ideas is observable in 1 Clement. One is tempted to the inference that in Rome the church assimilated itself to the mystery religions to a far less degree than in Asia Minor. Owing perhaps to a preponderance of the Jewish element, or perhaps to an innate shrinking from mysticism, it took the direction of a reformed Judaism rather than of a Hellenistic theosophy.

The writer of Hebrews conceives of Christianity as a *ὁμολογία*, which it is the duty of the believer to hold fast in spite of all temptations to drift away. This identification of the new faith with a given body of beliefs and practices, which must be accepted once for all, was no doubt a feature of Catholic Christianity in general. But it was congenial in a special degree to the Roman type of mind, and the Roman church seems to have been chiefly instrumental in fixing it. Loyalty to the confession is coupled in the Epistle — and here we can discern another Roman trait — with reverence for the past, for the ancient institutions of Israel and the bygone teachers of the church. From one point of view the writing is nothing but a prolonged plea to live worthily of the past, upholding its traditions and carrying them out to yet higher issues.

Christianity is presented not as a new revelation but as the perfecting of all that was true and significant in the history of the past. More than any other New Testament writer the author of Hebrews stands for the principle of authority; and this, it must be acknowledged, is the theological weakness of the Epistle. For Paul the fundamental truths are the real and vital ones, and he is ever striving to understand them better and grasp them more certainly. For this writer they are so much to be taken for granted, "the rudiments of the doctrine of Christ," from which we must pass on, in the quest for a higher knowledge. In a sense he might be called the first of the scholastics. He sets himself to elaborate a soaring theory on no other ultimate basis than that of authority, the authority of Scripture and of the received "confession." In this feature of the Epistle we may discern not merely the mark of Catholic Christianity, but the individual signature of Rome.

It is not a little remarkable that the polemical motive plays hardly any part in the Epistle. The one reference to "strange teachings" (13 9) is of an incidental nature, and concerns some ascetic tendency which does not seem to have affected any cardinal Christian belief. In other New Testament writings of approximately the same date heresy is already the burning question, but the writer in Hebrews is content to leave it wholly on one side. This may partly be accounted for on the supposition that the Epistle is addressed to a select group of mature converts, in little danger of falling into the extravagances of semi-pagan speculation. But if heresy had begun to be a serious peril to the community at large, some polemic against it could hardly have been avoided. There is fair ground for concluding that the Epistle contemplates a church which as yet had been little troubled by false teaching, and Rome best answers to this condition. All the evidence goes to prove that the effort to drag Christianity into the syncre-



tistic movement began in the East, and did not manifest itself at Rome until a later date. Ignatius does not speak the language of mere compliment when he acknowledges the Roman church to be "filtered clear from every foreign stain." Indeed there are numerous indications that Rome, even when it became the centre of the great Gnostic teachers, did not afford the most congenial soil for their propaganda. It is noticeable that the one reference to false doctrine in our Epistle touches on the same form of error with which Paul deals — in order to condone it — in the fourteenth chapter of Romans. This coincidence must not be pressed, for an interval of about a generation lies between the two Epistles, not to speak of the cataclysm under Nero. At the same time it is not impossible that the ascetic tendency of which Paul is aware had persisted in the Roman church, and had grown to be something of a danger to higher religious interests.

Our Epistle has nothing whatever to say of the cleavage between Jew and Gentile. The old idea that the writer addresses himself to a purely Jewish audience and therefore ignores the alien section of the church, may now, I imagine, be safely discarded. No result of modern criticism seems more assured than that the title, "to the Hebrews," is a misnomer. For the writer the fusion of Jew and Gentile in the new Israel has become so complete that he can transfer to the church, without further question, the prerogatives of God's ancient people. He assumes that the new covenant links itself on to the old and perfects it; that believers, of whatever race they spring, are the sons and heirs of Abraham. This disappearance of the old division is perhaps an evidence of the date of the Epistle more than of its place of origin; but there is reason to believe that at Rome earlier than elsewhere Jews and Gentiles were finally united in one common church. In 1 Clement as in Hebrews the distinction between them is never drawn, and Jewish institutions and ordinances are freely

appealed to as normative for the church. It is easily conceivable that in the larger atmosphere of Rome the early dissensions had rapidly died down, and that the pressure of common danger had also done its part in bringing the two parties in the church together. Moreover, the development of the church as an institution would inevitably work for fusion. At Rome the demand for order and uniformity was always paramount, and ancient lines of division had little chance of maintaining themselves.

Perhaps it is only a matter of accident that the classical passage on the impossibility of repentance after baptism is found in Hebrews (6 4 ff. Cf. also 12 17). The view expressed in the passage was the logical consequence of primitive ideas regarding baptism, and was held, we can scarcely doubt, by Christian teachers generally. None the less, it is the writer of Hebrews who insists on it in emphatic language. Not once only, but on two separate occasions he goes out of his way to declare that repentance after baptism is impossible. One can hardly avoid the impression that between the view so strongly maintained in the Epistle and the polemic in the *Shepherd of Hermas* there is some direct relation. It seems not too bold to conjecture that in the church of Rome the question of post-baptismal repentance had early come to the forefront, and had been discussed with peculiar warmth. The laxer position with which Rome identified itself in the following century may already have found its advocates, and the writer of Hebrews may have felt it necessary to combat it. In this case we should have to reckon him in that succession of conservative leaders who vainly attempted for several centuries to resist the Roman tendency to soften the ancient discipline.

These points of contact with Roman Christianity all belong, as might have been expected, to those larger assumptions which underlie the special thesis of the Epistle. If the doctrine of the heavenly priesthood of Christ is an



example of Gnosis, we may regard it as more or less peculiar to the writer himself. Traces of it may be discovered elsewhere, in early Christian as well as in Jewish apocalyptic literature, and it is more than probable that he avails himself of a conception that was already current. But there is every reason to believe that he was the first who thought of elaborating it into a central Christian doctrine. Not only does he speak of it himself as something new and hard to be understood, but all later versions of it are obviously derived from him, and from him alone. Granting, however, that he works out a speculation of his own, we can well conceive how it might have been suggested to him by Roman influences. In Rome ceremonial aspects of religion were always emphasized. Christianity was not so much a mode of inner communion with God as a purer form of worship, and the whole question of ritual was under constant discussion. Clement, in a passage already referred to, appeals to the priestly ordinances of the Old Testament as still in some measure valid, and as providing a model for the church. Now it is true that the writer of Hebrews has little interest in ecclesiastical order and ceremony. His doctrine of the priesthood of Christ, pushed to its logical conclusion, would make all the external forms of Christian as well as Jewish worship superfluous. Yet it is not difficult to understand how a contemplative mind might be led to this doctrine in a church that was accustomed to think of religion in the terms of ritual. Just as the Fourth Evangelist in the mystical atmosphere of Ephesus conceived of Christianity as an inward divine life, so this Roman thinker would define it to himself as a worship, an approach to God through the ministry of the great High Priest.

The Epistle, whatever may have been its origin, is marked by a curious affinity at once to the earliest and to the latest phases of New Testament thought. On the one hand, it adopts the Alexandrian categories and rests on

the assumptions of Catholic Christianity. Were it not for the definite evidences of its early date we might be disposed to class it with the Apologies of the following century rather than with the writings of the Apostolic age. On the other hand, it is reminiscent of the primitive tradition. In its naïve acceptance of the apocalyptic scheme, its view of Christianity as a perfected Judaism, its interest in the historical Jesus, its rejection of mystical and sacramental ideas, it seems to reflect the attitude of the church in Jerusalem. The two opposite types of thought are never really reconciled. They are interwoven, often with remarkable skill, but the primitive strain can be clearly distinguished from the later one with which it is combined. May we not discover the true explanation of this dual character of the Epistle in the conditions under which Christianity had developed at Rome? It had been introduced, apparently in the very earliest years of the church, by unknown missionaries, who had taught the gospel as it was understood by the mother community. In the church which they founded the original tradition held its own, and was never reinterpreted on Hellenistic lines, as in the Pauline churches. None the less, in a Gentile environment it was bound to come to terms with the Gentile ideas. The primitive type of thought persisted, but was overlaid by a theology with which it had no inner connection. Instead of the fusion which was effected elsewhere by the genius of Paul, there was a process of stratification.

Apart, however, from all debatable questions, there are solid grounds for believing that the Epistle to the Hebrews is our earliest monument of Roman Christianity, and a closer investigation of it from this point of view is much to be desired. No writing in the New Testament has been more unfortunate in its interpreters. Under the influence of false or one-sided theories it has been handed over to specialists in Jewish ritual or Alexandrian philosophy; it



has been treated as the outcome of some obscure side-current in Christian thought, which was destined to lose itself among the sands. A more adequate criticism may come in time to recognize it as a historical document of the first importance, throwing light on the genesis of that type of Christianity which, through the premier church, was at last to win predominance.

## THE INTEGRITY OF THE INTELLECT

RALPH BARTON PERRY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is characteristic of today that the intellect should require such humble allegiance as that which I offer in this lame and halting discourse.

“But yesterday the word of Reason might  
Have stood against the world; now lies it there,  
And none so poor to do it reverence.”

Among the ancients reason was enthroned as “the ruling faculty” of man, and the essential attribute of God. The greatest of the Christian philosophers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, were its devotees. The seventeenth-century revolt against mediævalism was conducted in its name. In the eighteenth century, to be sure, reason, in the narrower sense, fell off somewhat in prestige; there was less confidence in the method of logic and mathematics. But this was offset by a heightened confidence in man’s powers of observation, so that the intellectual or cognitive faculties as a whole were greatly increased both in authority and in the extent of their dominion.

Since the eighteenth century the intellect has rapidly declined, until today it actually needs friends. Even those who have nominally acted as its friends have contributed to its downfall. I mean those who, like the Hegelians, have inducted reason into a sort of mock kingship, a sort of British monarchy over the empire of being. For by asserting that the real is the rational, by insisting upon having the sun rise and set in the name of reason, these thinkers have reduced reason to a mere symbol, a mere cloak of respectability, in which reality, such as it is, may still be venerated. From other quarters have come rougher if less fatal blows. Modern psychology, speaking for emotion



and instinct, has reduced intellect to impotence over life. Metaphysics has subordinated it to will. Bergson and his followers have charged it with falsehood and issued a general warning against its misrepresentations; while with pragmatists and instrumentalists it is sunk so low that it is dressed in livery and sent to live in the servants' quarters. It is against this last indignity in particular that I wish to speak a word of protest, to the end that the intellect may be accorded full rights within the community of human activities and interests.

Since doctors disagree, we must leave open the question as to whether the war was the result of too much intellect or too little. Dr. Hobhouse of England felt the pulse of suffering humanity, and issued the statement that the war was the result of the recent neglect of the intellect, the result of too much "will to live," too much "*élan vital*," too much of the "it's-true-if-it-works" sort of philosophy. He recommended a quiet life and as much logic as the system could assimilate. But Dr. Boutroux of France made a very different diagnosis, in fact quite the opposite. He said that humanity was suffering from too much science and too little feeling, especially in its Prussian parts; and he prescribed sentiment and milk of human kindness. So we may for the present pass the application by, and content ourselves with discussing the following question in general terms: Is the intellect to be regarded as autonomous and self-sufficient, as pursuing ends of its own, and as judging by standards of its own? or is it to be regarded as the servant of alien interests which impose their ends and standards upon it?

The modern tendency has been towards the latter or practical interpretation of the knowing faculties. This tendency appears to be divisible into four main phases. First, there is the rise of experimentalism in scientific method. The science of the seventeenth century, reflected in Cartesianism, was confident of the power of the rea-

soning processes to reach indubitable certainties. In the next century, however, experimentalism gradually superseded scientific rationalism, affecting first the empirical sciences, then the pure sciences, and finally, in our own day, even mathematics itself. Experiment rests on hypothesis-making, which is evidently a voluntary operation, a case of trial and error, of success or failure. The results of experiment are subject to correction, and can never be indubitably certain; and yet there must be results, such as they are, because man needs them to live by. Thus practical need, rather than logical necessity, reveals itself as the master motive of science. Second, there is the growth of applied science, the increased interest in the control and reconstruction of nature, accompanied by a decline in the practice of meditation or the vocation of the intellectual life. Third, there is the voluntaristic metaphysics, in which the act or impulse of thought is construed as more real than the ideas, its passive states. Or it is argued that the will to think at all, and the willingness to acknowledge reasons, are deeper than the particular reasons for thinking this idea rather than that. Finally, there is the growing influence of biology and the application of biological principles to the human faculties, thought among the rest. Man is said to have brains because they enable him to survive. Intelligence is construed as an organic function, and reason as developed or evolved intelligence.

Among these influences tending to subordinate the intellect there is only one that can be regarded as fundamentally questionable or likely to be reversed in the light of further investigation; and that is the voluntaristic metaphysics. The rest are influences that in a broad sense have come to stay. We cannot expect to see any decline of experimentalism in science, or in the scope and influence of applied science, nor any abandonment of the view that man and his faculties belong to the field of the biological



sciences and are therefore subject to the methods and laws which are proper to that field. In what follows I shall therefore regard these ideas as prescribing terms on which the status of the intellect must be defined. In particular, I shall cordially accept the biological view of the intellect; partly because I believe such a view to be ultimately and philosophically sound; partly because it is in any case acceptable in the limited scientific sense, so that we may, if we wish, waive these ultimate philosophical considerations and still reach conclusions that are in some sense true. In the biological view of the intellect I find nothing derogatory to that faculty; but on the contrary I find a justification even for the most extravagant claims that have been made in its behalf. Let me state what I find, first in general terms, and then with more circumstance and detail.

If we speak of the intellect as an organ in the biological sense, we mean the central nervous system in its cognitive rather than its motor and affective functions. Now this intellectual organ, like any organ, has its office or rôle in the life of the organism as a whole. As it depends on the nutritive, circulatory, and respiratory organs, so these in turn depend on it. It obtains its share of good only by virtue of contributing its share of service. We are taught by biology to believe that the organism carries no passengers, but only members of the crew, each with an allotted part in keeping the ship afloat and bringing it to port. Let me mention some of these duties of the intellect so that we may have them clearly before our minds. Through its sensory mechanisms the intellect enables the organism to time its responses, to keep in touch with occurrences in the environment, and to act opportunely. Through memory and association the intellect enables the organism to profit by the successes and failures of the past, and to learn better. Through the mechanisms of language and ideation the intellect enables the organism to extend the range and

freedom of its behavior by responding to situations distant in space and time, and by initiating action in the absence of an immediately exciting cause. Through its power of discrimination the intellect enables the organism to deal with those more abstract relations of things which are identical, persistent, and recurrent; and so to acquire a kind of concentrated adaptation and equipment — one that is suited to the multiple and varied emergencies of life while being at the same time light enough to carry. Finally, through the integrative action of the nervous system the organism is enabled to adjust its responses among themselves, and thus to proceed smoothly and consistently toward the execution of larger plans and purposes. These are some of the services which the intellect renders to the organism to which it belongs, and by which it earns its passage. Intellection is in this sense on a par with breathing and fighting and food-getting. Like these other functions it may be said to succeed or to fail according as it does or does not accomplish the specific task assigned to it.

Shall we then say that the proof of the intellect is in the living? that a healthy life argues a healthy intellect? that good thinking is whatever works? or that sound knowledge is whatever stands the test of time — whatever is accepted by the surviving minds that have sustained the struggle for existence?

What should we say if a physiologist were to assert that sound digestion is digestion that works, digestion that causes health, long life, and survival? I think we should be bored. It is an obvious, loose, and irrelevant view of the matter. Suppose an expert in military science were asked to define the standards and criteria of good generalship, and he should say, "A good general is one who wins battles." This might do as a *bon mot*, or as a confession of inability to provide an adequate definition; but in any case it evidently evades the issue by means of a



doubtfully true truism — doubtfully true because it is always possible in special circumstances that a good general should lose a battle, or a man with a good digestion find an early grave. In other words, what is called for is the specification of that particular state or activity which is peculiar to good digestion, or to good generalship, *as such*; the distinctive attainment by virtue of which digestion may contribute to health, or generalship to military success. Each of these functions has a success of its own to achieve, by which alone it is a factor in the success of the more general enterprise in which it participates. And this proper, distinctive success is to be judged by its own proper, distinctive standard.

Now let us apply this to the case of the intellect. This organ is a participant in the general organic enterprise, and the success of that enterprise is a rough and probable index of the success of the intellect. But the intellect has its own peculiar work to do, and it may do that work well or ill. Even though it does it well the life as a whole may fail owing to the failure of some other auxiliary function. In that case we may properly say of the intellect, "*That organ was not at fault. It did what was required of it.*" There is, in short, a distinctively intellectual success or failure, which is to be judged in its own proper terms, which is to be found in the state or activity of the intellect itself, and in its relation to the field and materials in which it operates.

But just as a specific organic function has its own peculiar standard and conditions of success and failure, so it may have and usually does have its own immediately inciting interest. Much of the success of pragmatism has been due to its very properly insisting that thinking is a kind of action, that it is impelled by motives and warmed by passions, like any other kind of action. But in its eagerness to insist on the organic status of the intellect, this theory has strangely neglected the originality and in-

dependence of these motives and passions. The term "instrumentalism," which has largely superseded the broader term "pragmatism," emphasizes the subordination of the intellect to ends beyond itself. But the organic analogy does in fact point to quite a different conclusion. Most organic functions are interested in their own behalf. I may even breathe for the sake of breathing. I may identify my soul with my lungs. I may form a cult of "United Breathers" or "Air Worshipers," and count as the supreme moments of my life those which I pass in profound and reverent respiration. Or consider the predatory instinct. This evidently has its place in the economy of life by virtue of providing food for carnivorous animals; but hunting is also an art and a pastime, which many have thought worth cultivating as an end in itself.

What is true of respiration and huntsmanship can scarcely be denied of an activity so developed, so varied, so self-conscious, as that of the intellect. Nor in this case any more than the others, does the subordinate rôle contradict the autonomous rôle. The devotee of breathing or of hunting need not cease to breathe or hunt for vital purposes; nor need the intellectualist, the scientist, the speculative philosopher, because he has cultivated the art of knowing for its own sake, therefore cease to use his mind for the conduct of affairs.

Such being the general thesis for which I contend, I wish now to set forth some of the peculiar and independent interests of the intellect, some of the autonomous activities in which it may discipline and perfect itself, and which will constitute its own unique contribution to life. I should like to distinguish five interests that seem to me to be capable of being independently sustained and that give rise to activities which may be disciplined and controlled by a methodical technique.

1. *Curiosity* is the empirical interest in particular facts, or the logical interest in implicative facts. Both interests

are explorative in character, tending to the expanding of the field of experience from a given center of attention. There is an impulse to look round the corner, or into the inside of what is perceived externally, or on the other side of this side. This is an impulse that drives men on travels and voyages of discovery for the sake of seeing things "first hand." These interests may be highly refined, and express themselves in systematic observation, microscopy, telescopy, analysis, and the pursuit of trains of implication to their conclusion.

2. *Systematic Thought* has its own independent motive, the interest in trying novel combinations of ideas, in building systems of supposition and conjecture. It is the impulse of intellectual inventiveness. This is the chief sustaining interest in the solution of theoretical problems, that is, in contriving combinations of ideas that shall exhibit certain formal characters, such as consistency and simplicity. It is important to note that thinking is never free in the sense of being lawless or without control. Even the most speculative thinking must "mean something," and possess a structure or coherence that is borrowed from the more fundamental relations of logic. The interest in systematic thought is the interest in creating new applications of fundamental structural principles, or in introducing systematic structure into a given subject-matter. So powerful is this interest that it has driven pedants to strange excesses. Students of philosophy will remember the awful effect upon the later Stoics and others of the paradox of the liar. *If you say truly that you are telling a lie, are you lying or telling the truth?* Chrysippus is reputed to have written five books on such "Inexplicables," six books on the Liar itself, a book against those who professed to solve the Liar by a process of division, three books on the solution of the Liar, and a polemic against those who asserted that the Liar had false premises! It is a wonder that Chrysippus did not die of it, like Philetas of Cos,



whose fate is recorded in his epitaph (as translated by Stock):

“Philetas of Cos am I;  
’T was the Liar made me die,  
And the bad nights caused thereby.”

3. *Verification* has its own sustaining interest, that, namely, which is felt in the case of fulfilled anticipation. The hypothesis is a determinate expectation, a motor set, which may or may not fit the situation to which it points. It is satisfied when one can say, “I told you so,” “It is as I thought,” “It is as it ought to be.” This is the interest in *truth*; truth being the value which attaches to a hypothesis or idea in so far as it fits the environment. The technique of induction is the technique of contriving such determinate expectations as can bear the ordeal of empirical fact.

These three are the intellectual interests proper. They are the *cognitive* or *objective* intellectual interests, interests which submit to control beyond the mind. They signify interest in that which is independent of and external to the interested mind; they move the mind to adapt itself to its environment rather than the environment to itself; they incline the mind to surrender and conform itself to the facts and necessities of being. With these are to be contrasted two pseudo-intellectual interests, which act as auxiliary incentives but which are indifferent and possibly opposed to the cognitive motive of the first three.

4. *Taste*, in the intellectual sense, is the love of the exercise of the cognitive faculties for its own sake and in ways that are congenial. It leads to a selective rather than an explorative sensuous experience, to a neglect of what is not sensuously agreeable, and to a prolongation of what is agreeable. It is especially likely to control the play of ideas and imagery, which are freer and more flexible than perception. There is, for example, a taste for unity, system,

and harmony. But this is not invariable, as is proved by James's relish for a world which he described in Blood's words as "wild, game-flavored as a hawk's wing, never an instant true, ever not quite." Taste may conflict with the interest in truth, as in the case of the ancients' bias for the circle as applied to the motions of celestial bodies.

5. *Belief* is an interest in confident anticipation, in having things settled. This value also is independent of truth in the stricter sense, as is seen in the desire to find a refuge in faith. There is an interest in beliefs that are congruent with desires, that fit other beliefs or the general trend of aspiration, even when such beliefs are contrary to evident fact.

Governed by one or more of these motives, it is possible to lead an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual life. It is possible to be preëminently, artfully, and methodically an explorer of facts, a speculative thinker, an experimental scientist, a devotee of culture, or a man of faith. One may be a specialist, an expert in any of these vocations, and with no thought of the extent to which his attainment ministers to his material success, his length of life, or to the well-being of society. Meanwhile, the usefulness of the intellect is not contradicted by such specialization, any more than the usefulness of bodily strength and skill is contradicted by the cults of athletics or craftsmanship.

It should be noted that the usefulness of the first three of these attainments is very different from that of the last two. The former or cognitive type of attainment contributes to adaptation and control; the latter, or subjective type contributes to inward satisfactions and volitional energies that must remain precarious and transient, in so far as they take no account of the external forces which condition both survival and achievement. In so far as philosophy, like science, professes an interest in knowledge, it owes its first allegiance to the former or objective interests of the intellect; and should subordinate taste and

credulity to curiosity, logical rigor, and the decrees of experimental evidence. This, however, philosophy has rarely been permitted to do. The demand for religious apologetics has been so strong, and doubtless will always be so strong, as to stimulate the production of the desired commodity. This demand is what the economists call an effective demand. It can offer sufficient inducements, in the shape of popular applause and influence. I do not mean to charge philosophers with any conscious apostasy to truth. But their atmosphere and tradition, and the established standards of judgment incline them by professional custom to seek a hopeful and edifying view of things.

Often it is less the philosopher who is at fault than his readers and hearers, who allow their hopes to color the teachings of the master, and make him in spite of himself the sponsor of some gospel of which he may never even have heard. M. Bergson is notoriously a victim of this doubtful flattery; so much so that he has even been accused of catering to it. Thus Remy de Gourmont wrote as follows in the *Mercure de France* in 1910, apropos of the death of William James:

"I believe that all philosophy that is not purely scientific (negative, that is, to metaphysics), comes at the end of the reckoning to reinforce Christianity under whatever form it dominates the various nations. Most persons who fancy themselves interested in what they call the great problems are moved by self-interested egotistical anxiety. They think of themselves and of their destiny; they hope to find by rational means a solution agreeable to their desires, which secretly conform to the earliest teachings they received. Now since all metaphysical movements are very obscure, or at least difficult of access to most minds, when these movements are confronted with religious beliefs the beliefs are found to be of the same order but clearer, having been known in the past. This phenomenon was exhibited at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The deism of J. J. Rousseau, which seemed so remote from Catholicism, made ready the ground for a renovation of Catholicism. Chateaubriand, thoroughly impregnated with Rousseau, was the first of this description. . . . William James, whose religiousness is indifferent to religious forms, has, without



knowing it, wrought in the same way for the sects. M. Bergson's spiral spirituality, with its scientific but treacherous charm, achieves the same result. The metaphysical clouds it eloquently stirs dissolve in a religious rain, and this rain, as it dries, leaves a sort of manna upon which belief is fed. There are more priests than intelligent free-thinkers at M. Bergson's lectures. The manner of postulating free will in a Catholic country like France takes on an apologetic value. The most illustrious of our metaphysicians must know very well what he is doing."

The aspersion with which this paragraph closes is unjust. But the philosophical masters as a group are nevertheless not wholly guiltless of the apologetic uses to which their work is applied. They have been too much addicted to the use of ambiguities, and to the use of vague terms of eulogy borrowed from the vocabulary in which plain men express their deeper yearnings and hopes. When philosophers write of Spirit and Freedom and God and Eternity, even though, as is usually the case, they employ these terms in peculiar and technical senses of their own, the plain man is scarcely to be blamed if he feels his yearnings and hopes to be confirmed. Indeed the ambiguity of philosophical terminology, a peculiar flabbiness of ideas which renders them incapable of sharply contradicting or excluding anything, and an excessive craving for comprehensiveness and reconciliation, have made it possible for protagonists of quite opposite doctrines to weave the same philosophy into their arguments.

Another French writer, M. Le Dantec, has commented on this last "remarkable property," not without a touch of satire. He says, virtually, that everybody gets out of metaphysics what he puts into it:

"If the speech of metaphysicians, like that of creative artists, is addressed to a restricted public composed solely of their personal 'resonators,' it possesses yet another property which renders it superior to the eminently impersonal language of mathematicians. This remarkable property is that those who perceive it, those who vibrate in harmony with the metaphysician or the artist, are not ordinarily

in accord upon what they understand. They are agreeably affected, and this is their only common ground; but that does not prevent their keeping their first attitude as to other matters, and notably towards religious and social questions. A Catholic and an anarchist who at the same time hear the Symphony in C minor, feel at the same time emotions probably different, and remain the one an anarchist, the other a Catholic, as before. I imagine they do not fancy that in his work Beethoven expressed precisely their religious or social belief; while, when they commune together in Bergson or in James, each of them recognizes the expression of his own thought in the work of these subtle artists; and both draw from the reading of metaphysical productions new reasons for their being — the one more an anarchist, the other more a Catholic than in the past."

Another cause which operates to compromise the intellect, a cause which is undoubtedly operating today, is just plain weariness. If we trace the history of modern thought, we find that one of its striking characteristics is the rejection of axioms. In the past, whenever any prop of faith was removed, the mind leaned more heavily than ever on the props that remained. Especially notable were the tendency in the eighteenth century to count upon the immutable truths of morality after the challenging of ecclesiastical and political authority; and the tendency in the nineteenth century to move the superstructure of belief from the crumbling foundations of religious metaphysics, such as the "cogito, ergo sum" and the proofs of theism, to the supposedly unshakable foundations of mathematics, such as the axioms of Euclid, or that last straw of the drowning mind, "Two plus two equals four." The critical intellect has now invaded every holy place, and spread a disquieting doubt through all the corridors of life. Doubt is a healthy and invigorating atmosphere for a hardy mind; but it is very tiring. The mind craves a place to sit down. It carries its idols about but cannot find any pedestal to support them. It suffers from homesickness, vertigo, and an unquenchable longing for stability and rest. It is little wonder that in such a time the churches

are recruited by those who are willing to shut their eyes if only they can be made to feel *sure* of something again. "It is sad to think," says Sir James Stephen, "how much theology in our days, whether Protestant or Popish, holds out to its disciples this great inducement: Come to me, all ye that are weary of doubt, and I will give you security that, if your creed is false, you shall be the last to discover it."

I would not be uncompromising in this matter. It is as possible to be fanatical on the subject of the intellect as on any other subject. I wish merely to point out that much of the distrust from which the intellectual activities suffer is not owing to their being futile or misapplied but to a circumstance that may discredit any good thing, namely, its difficulty. Thinking is not only, as Adam Bede said, "mighty puzzling work," a strain upon human strength and patience, but it is of all forms of work the most lonely. People act and feel and even believe, in mobs. There is (Professor Cooley to the contrary notwithstanding) no first person plural to the verb "*cogito*." Observation, verification, and inference are functions which are perfected only in their independent individual exercise. I am not unmindful of the importance of the corroboration of one mind by another; but such corroboration is valuable only in so far as both minds have reached their results alone. Corroboration implies the absence of collusion. The devotee of the intellect must, then, have the strength to work alone, to see things for himself, to stand against the currents of opinion and the winds of passion. He cannot hope to win applause by the easy method of agreeing with others, but only by the more difficult method of bringing others to agree with him. And even then he cannot allow himself to mistake his following for confirmation of his beliefs, but must be ready to desert his converts if and in so far as fresh evidence inclines his judgment to another view. He is as unlikely, then, to be a leader, as he



is incapable of being a follower. For such non-conformists society must make a place. I have little interest in the "conscientious objector"; but I have the greatest regard for the *individual thinker*. The former opposes private conviction to public policy. His inflexibility is symptomatic of will and emotion, rather than enlightenment. The latter opposes freedom of thought to uniformity of opinion. Though he may impede collective action and have in emergencies even to be forcibly suppressed, nevertheless he is the servant of mankind. Standing on his watchtower and recording what he sees, he does, even though it be unconsciously, succor the community to which he belongs.

I should not thus have apostrophized the devotee of the intellect had I not believed that society needs him, and needs him as never before. The great problems of the present are in fact *problems*. We all want enduring peace and we all want social justice; but we need to be *shown the way*. The great difficulties are difficulties of complexity. Human interests, man to man and nation to nation, are now interrelated and interdependent, extensively and intensively, in a measure entirely unparalleled in the past history of the world. Intellect is the only means by which their tragic conflict may be removed. There seems to be a widespread belief that all we need in order to avoid war and class struggle is a little horse-sense. We shall, however, be fortunate if the cerebrum of some future superman is equal to coping with these problems. They are *the problems*, magnificently, terrifyingly difficult. Therein lies what is hopeful and stirring in the situation. If we fail, we shall have dared the utmost; if we succeed, we shall have won the greatest of all victories in the struggle of man against the death from which he sprang and which circles him about.

If we value what the intellect can do, then we should value the intellect. We all want to live and to prosper in

peace. For these ends intellect is one of the things needful, if not the one thing needful. It does not follow, however, that we should live with the intellect, or practice a trade or profession with it, any more than that we should breathe with it or eat with it. My suggestion is that we should *think* with it, and then use the results as we will. In some measure the intellect must be allowed to lead its own life and perfect itself in its own way if we are to have its indispensable fruits most abundantly. In so far as it is the lot of the intellect to serve, it must be as a trusted and self-respecting servant. As the counselor of the will, it is dangerous if constrained to flatter the will's hopes or to do its bidding, but a mighty ally if taught to speak its mind honestly and fearlessly.

## JOHN ROBINSON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

WILLIAM WALLACE FENN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

"In the next place, for the wholesome counsel Mr. Robinson gave that part of the Church whereof he was Pastor, at their departure from him to begin the great work of Plantation in New England. Amongst other wholesome instructions and exhortations, he used these expressions, or to the same purpose:

We are now, ere long, to part asunder; and the Lord knoweth whether ever he should live to see our faces again. But whether the Lord had appointed it or not; he charged us, before God and his blessed angels, to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other Instrument of his, to be as ready to receive it, as ever we were to receive any truth by his Ministry. For he was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of his holy Word.

He took occasion also miserably to bewail the state and condition of the Reformed Churches, who were come to a period in religion; and would go no further than the Instruments of their Reformation. As, for example, the Lutherans: they could not be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw. For whatever part of God's will, he had further imparted and revealed to Calvin; they will rather die than embrace it. 'And so also,' saith he, 'You see the Calvinists. They stick where he left them; a misery much to be lamented.

'For though they were precious shining lights in their Times; yet God had not revealed his whole will to them; and were they now living,' saith he, 'they would be as ready and willing to embrace further light as that they had received.'

Here also he put us in mind of our Church Covenant; at least that part of it whereby we promise and covenant with God and one with another, to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from his written Word; but withal exhorted us to take heed what we received for truth; and well to examine and compare, and weigh it with other Scriptures of truth before we received it. 'For,' saith he, 'It is not possible the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness; and that full perfection of knowledge should break forth at once.'

Another thing he commended to us, was that we should use all means to avoid and shake off the name 'Brownist'; being a mere



nickname and brand to make religion odious, and the Professors of it, to the Christian world. 'And to that end,' said he, 'I should be glad if some godly Minister would go over with you, before my coming. For, said he, there will be no difference between the unconformable Ministers and you, when they come to the practice of the ordinances out of the Kingdom.' And so advised us, by all means, to endeavor to close with the godly party of the Kingdom of England, and rather to study union than division, viz., How near we might possibly, without sin, close with them; than, in the least measure, to affect division or separation from them."

So run the notable paragraphs in the so-called Farewell Address, delivered by John Robinson to that portion of his Leyden church of Separatists which had elected to become Pilgrims to this new world, the tercentenary of whose landing at Plymouth is soon to be celebrated. It is not clear precisely when or where the Address was delivered, whether as part of the sermon which Robinson preached from Ezra 8 21 when the as yet undivided church held its last meeting in Leyden, or as a fragment of the "Christian discourse" with which the Pilgrims and the friends they were leaving comforted themselves in Delfshaven on the night before the *Speedwell* sailed. But time and place are immaterial, for the words have a timeless and universal character which must endear them and John Robinson who spoke them to lovers of religious freedom and progress everywhere and always. So remarkable are they, all things considered, that one is tempted to suspect their authenticity. Can John Robinson, a Separatist minister, have been so broad-minded and large-hearted as to speak thus in 1620? The doubt was insinuated by Mr. George Sumner in a *Memoir of the Pilgrims in Leyden*, published in 1846 in the Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, (ser. 3, vol. IX). Without actually denying authenticity, Mr. Sumner pointed out that the argument from silence, taken in connection with the peculiar appropriateness of the words to the argument of the book in which alone the Address appears, justly

arouses suspicion. Both points are well taken. It is true that neither Bradford nor Morton gives any inkling of the Address, and that the sole authority is Winslow's *Hypocrisy Unmasked* which was published in 1646, twenty-six years afterwards. It is also true that in *Hypocrisy Unmasked*, Winslow was defending the Plymouth settlers against charges of intolerance and bigotry, and naturally it was much to his purpose to show that their revered religious teacher had inculcated principles of catholicity on so solemn and memorable an occasion as that of their departure from Holland. But on the other hand every historian knows that the argument from silence is weak and treacherous. Winslow had been with the Leyden company for three years prior to the departure from Holland, and as one of the *Speedwell* and *Mayflower* pilgrims, had full opportunity to know what was said and done. It should be noted, too, that he does not profess to give the precise words used but reports in indirect discourse "these expressions or to the same purpose." As for the *tendency* argument, here too it must be said that no "tendency document" should be rejected out of hand just because it has a tendency, unless it can be proved that the tendency is untrue to the facts. Was Winslow the sort of man to fabricate an address like this, not out of whole cloth but out of no cloth at all, in order to strengthen his argument? One ought to think not once nor twice before accusing Winslow of dishonesty, for really that is what it comes to, if in order to serve his turn and strengthen his plea, he put into the mouth of Robinson words which he never used. It is rather mean to seek to prove that Robinson was not a liberal by insinuating that Winslow was a liar. Besides, as will be shown presently, the words are in entire accord with the sentiments of Robinson as preserved in writings of unquestioned genuineness.

If then the Address must be deemed substantially authentic, precisely what does it mean? It sounds like a

remarkable affirmation of freedom and progress in religion, but perhaps Robinson did not intend that his words should be taken quite so comprehensively. This has been maintained by certain ecclesiastical descendants of the Pilgrims who have been nettled by the use made of his words to shelter liberalism in theology under the protection of an honored name. In the early part of the nineteenth century there appeared among the descendants of the early settlers hereabouts a party which took to itself the name of Liberal Christian, by the members of which the words of Robinson were freely and triumphantly quoted. More conservative opponents might attack religious freedom and progress in a periodical entitled *The Spirit of the Pilgrims*, but the Liberals were proud to believe that theirs was the true spirit of the Pilgrims, John Robinson himself being witness. Naturally, this was exceedingly irritating to the Conservatives, but there was no effective rejoinder until the publication in 1880 of Dr. Dexter's monumental book *Congregationalism as Seen in its Literature* in which it was argued that in the famous Address Robinson was thinking solely of church polity and not at all of theological doctrine. Although this view has found little acceptance, Dr. Dexter was a most competent scholar and his case is stronger than has been commonly supposed. Let me therefore put the argument for the narrower interpretation of the Farewell Address as clearly and forcibly as possible before presenting certain other considerations which warrant at least an arrest of judgment.

First then it must be remembered that the Separatists were separatists just because of questions of church polity and not at all on matters of theological dogma. The Puritans, whose left wing they were, differed from the Church of England partly on doctrine — they were stout Calvinists while the Anglicans inclined rather to Arminianism — partly on the score of ritual, for there was much of Rome still clinging to the vestments and ceremonies of



the Church of England which they would fain reform, but partly also on account of their preference for the presbyterial organization of Geneva over the Episcopacy of England. But they believed in the Church of England and wished to remain within its fold achieving the reforms they demanded by working from within. Among them, however, were some who came to believe that on account of its corruptions in organization and ritual the Church of England, in their elegant phrase, was as very a whore as the Church of Rome and consequently no true bride of Christ. Accordingly they took to heart the apostolic injunction, "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing." In their eyes the Church of England was Sodom, Babylon, a cage of unclean birds, within which they could not stay save at the peril of their souls and the dishonor of Christ. Hence they became Separatists, differing from the Puritans not in doctrine, for both alike were Calvinists, but principally in a theory of the church and a method of reformation in harmony with that theory. Their study of the Scriptures had led them to the conclusion that the true church of Christ was a purer and a simpler thing than either Rome or Canterbury acknowledged. It was at this point then that new light had broken for them out of God's holy Word, for which cause they were Separatists.

Secondly, it was again at this very point that new light had recently come to Robinson himself. He had held that because the Church of England was a false church it was sinful for one who had received the new light to have public communion with it, even to the extent of being present at one of its services, or private communion with any of its members. A member of a Separated church in Amsterdam who attended a service of the Church of England was excommunicated for the offense. At this point, however, new light had come to John Robinson following an interchange of views between himself and Dr. William Ames,

the famous Puritan scholar and clergyman. In Robinson's own words:

"But had my persuasion in it been fuller than ever it was, I profess myself always one of them who still desire to learn further, or better, what the good will of God is. And I beseech the Lord from mine heart, that there may be in the men (towards whom I desire in all things lawful to enlarge myself) the like readiness of mind to forsake every evil way, and faithfully to embrace and walk in the truth they do or may see, as by the mercy of God there is in me: which as I trust it shall be mine, so do I wish it may be their comfort also in the day of the Lord Jesus."

The quotation is from a treatise *Of Religious Communion*, published in 1614, in which he upheld the lawfulness of private communion with individual members of the Church of England but still denied that a Separatist could rightfully participate in the public worship of the Church or listen to the preaching of its ministers. Twenty years later, however, nine years after the death of Robinson, there was published another treatise by him, found in manuscript in his desk, entitled *On the Lawfulness of hearing Ministers in the Church of England*, in which public communion also is defended. It must be remembered also that because of this greater tolerance, Robinson's church was condemned by their fellow-Separatists at Amsterdam, one of whom refers to the Semi-Separatists at Leyden as "ignorant idiots, noddie Nabalites, dogged Doegs, fairfaced Pharisees, shameless Shimeites, malicious Machiavellians." These be hard words, Masters, with their pelting alliterations, and perhaps their author would have been puzzled to explain their peculiar aptness, but one can safely infer that he did not wholly approve of John Robinson and his church. But the point is that at just about the time when the Pilgrims were leaving Leyden, new light was breaking upon Robinson's mind on this particular point which, be it observed, is precisely that touched upon in the Farewell

Address when he urges his Pilgrim friends to close with the godly party of the Church of England, seeking unity rather than division, and even expresses his desire that some godly minister would go over with them. Surely then here is good ground for believing that in the Farewell Address he was thinking not of doctrine but of polity, better ground if I may be so presumptuous as to say so, than Dr. Dexter himself has given.

Finally, it is true, as Dr. Dexter insists, that Robinson was a convinced Calvinist and that nowhere in all his writings is there the faintest suggestion of any wavering in his mind with respect to the truth of that system of doctrine. Remember also the source from which the anticipated new light and truth were to come — His holy Word. Certainly Robinson did not look for new religious truth to human reason, or to any other source than the book of God's perfect and final revelation. One must confess that the so-called Liberals have taken Robinson in a sense which he would have repudiated with indignant horror when they have quoted "*more truth and light*" with orotund voice and whispered or even passed over in silence "*God's holy Word.*"

So stands, then, the argument for the narrower interpretation of the Farewell Address, and evidently the case is a strong one although perhaps not wholly convincing. For there are considerations on the opposite side. Robinson bewailed the state of the followers both of Luther and of Calvin who had come to a stand in religion, being unwilling to advance beyond the instruments of their reformation — "a misery much to be lamented." Is it at all reasonable to suppose that here Robinson was thinking exclusively of the teachings of Luther or Calvin concerning church polity? Again, he reminded the Pilgrims of the Covenant by which they had constituted themselves a church, wherein they made solemn promise to God and to one another to receive whatever light or



truth God should make known to them from his written Word. This is plainly a reference to the Bradford Covenant with its memorable outlook clause — “to walk in all *His* ways, made known or to be made known unto us.” Did *all His ways* denote only ways of church polity? Certainly in the administration of discipline upon those who had thus covenanted together, the Pilgrims did not so restrict it — God’s ways were moral as well as ecclesiastical; in the street and home God walked as well as in the sanctuary, and there too men must walk in his ways. Again, it has been said that the distinction which we make so easily and properly between dogma and polity was foreign to the mind of Robinson, since both were of revelation. There is some truth in the contention; nevertheless Robinson did distinguish between them and with remarkable insight put them in their proper places on a scale of values:

“I will, therefore, conclude this point with a double exhortation: the former, respecting us ourselves, who have, by the mercy of God, with the faith of Christ, received his order and ordinances; which is, that we please not ourselves therein too much, as if in them piety and religion did chiefly consist. . . . Of which evil, and over valuation of these things, howsoever great in themselves, we are in the more danger, considering our persecutions, and sufferings for them; but that, as we believe these things are necessarily to be done, so we consider that other things are not only not to be left undone, but to be done much more. The grace of faith in Christ, and the fear of God, the continual renewing of our repentance, with love, mercy, humility, and modesty, together with fervent prayer, and hearty thanksgiving unto God for his unspeakable goodness, are the things wherein especially we must serve God; nourishing them in our own hearts, and so honoring them in others, wheresoever they appear to dwell.”

I find it hard to believe that a man who could write with such fine moral insight and tender grace of style could have been thinking only of church polity when he was speaking words of solemn farewell to friends who were starting on their pilgrimage. Nevertheless, it may be

true that if some one had asked Robinson, point-blank and on the spot, exactly what he meant, it is not improbable that he would have replied by urging peace between Separatist and Puritan. There is no question in view of quotations already made from his published works and especially in view of the Wallaeus-Hommium document that at just this time he was less stout than he had been for the Separation and was yearning for a broader Christian fellowship. Nor is it at all unlikely that he foresaw that his little company would be the precursors of a much larger and more important Puritan migration and that the relations between the two parties in the New World would be, and indeed must be, more fraternal than was the case in England and Holland. It was probably this thought which filled his mind rather than any hope for new revelations of doctrine. And yet, while admitting so much, one must add that to draw from this an inference adverse to Robinson's catholicity of mind, such catholicity as the usual interpretation of the Farewell Address has ascribed to him, would be thoroughly unjust. For although a principle may be consciously recognized at only a single point of application determined by immediate and pressing interests, it may nevertheless be a genuine principle exhibiting a general mental attitude and therefore sure to find other and perhaps more significant applications should occasion arise. And this, I take it, was precisely the case with John Robinson. As one reads his published words in chronological order, he becomes aware of a gradual loss of youthful acidity and a progressive mellowing of tone. He became more open-minded, and when a man's mind is actually open, so it be not merely at the bottom, there is no telling what may find entrance. Nor need the mind be open at all points i' the shipman's card; a man may be perfectly hospitable yet all his various guests may enter by a single door. That Robinson was actually growing into catholicity of spirit

with advancing years of experience and religious thoughtfulness is apparent from the honor paid him by men of various parties. Baillie, whose *Dissuasives* (1645) is bitterly against Separatists, says of Robinson that he was the most learned, polished, and modest spirit that sect ever enjoyed. Bradford both in the *History* and in the *First Dialogue* bears similar testimony. But one need not go beyond Robinson's own writings to be assured of his sweetness and largeness of temper. Take for example the concluding paragraph of *A Just and Necessary Apology* published in Latin in 1619, and in English, translated by himself, in 1625.

"And here thou hast, Christian reader, the whole order of our conversation in the work of Christian religion, set down both as briefly and plainly as I could. If in any thing we err, advertise us brotherly, with desire of our information, and not, as our countrymen's manner for the most part is, with a mind of reproaching us, or gratifying of others; and whom thou findest in error, thou shalt not leave in obstinacy, nor as having a mind prone to schism. Err we may, alas! too easily; but heretics, by the grace of God, we will not be. But and if the things which we do seem right in thine eyes, as to us certainly they do, I do earnestly, and by the Lord Jesus admonish and exhort thy godly mind, that thou wilt neither withhold thy due obedience from his truth, nor just succour from thy distressed brethren. Neither do thou endure that either the smallness of the number, or meanness of the condition of those that profess it, should prejudice with thee the profession of the truth. . . . But now if it so come to pass, which God forbid! that the most being either forestalled by prejudice, or by prosperity made secure, there be few found, especially men of learning, who will so far vouchsafe to stoop as to look upon so despised creatures and their cause; this alone remaineth, that we turn our faces and mouths unto thee, O most powerful Lord and gracious Father, humbly imploring help from God towards those who are by men left desolate. There is with thee no respect of persons, neither are men less regards of thee, if regards of thee, for the world's disregarding them. They who truly fear thee and work righteousness, although constrained to live by leave in a foreign land, exiled from country, spoiled of goods, destitute of friends, few in number, and mean in condition, are for all that, unto thee (O gracious God)



nothing the less acceptable. Thou numberest all their wanderings, and putttest their tears into thy bottles. Are they not written in thy book? Towards thee, O Lord, are our eyes; confirm our hearts and bend thine ear, and suffer not our feet to slip, or our face to be ashamed, O thou both just and merciful God. To him through Christ be praise for ever in the church of saints; and to thee, loving and Christian reader, grace, peace, and eternal happiness. Amen."

I must say that I know of no bit of English prose in the controversial literature of the period which begins to compare with that in tender and appealing grace. It fairly melts in a reader's mouth and is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb. Be the precise interpretation of the Farewell Address what it may, John Robinson himself, in inmost spirit and temper was all that the very broadest interpretation of it has led us to think, and it meant much to our Pilgrim forefathers that they had a religious teacher of such a sort as this. It meant much to them and much also to the future of Plymouth, Massachusetts, New England, and the United States that was to be. For what has been said may seem to be merely of antiquarian or what is sometimes slurringly called academic interest, but in reality it bears upon important issues. The Pilgrims came to Plymouth and for the first few years the future of the little colony hung in the balance. Without were an inhospitable climate and unfruitful soil, disease, famine, and menacing savages, and if within there had been bickerings and dissensions, the little company must inevitably have crumbled. And there was reason to expect internal wranglings, for these people were Separatists, who as a class were a painfully cantankerous lot. By good chance there has been preserved for us an account of the petty quarrels in the church of Separatists in Amsterdam of which Francis Johnson was pastor. He had married, while the church was still in London, the widow of a well-to-do haberdasher, and his brother George Johnson remonstrated with his brother for her extravagance in

dress, wearing three, four, and five golden rings at once, a showish hat, great starched ruffs, an excessive deal of lace and a cod-piece fashion in the breast, and using musk perfumery, while her husband and the church were in prison at home and poverty abroad. The pastor made a spirited rejoinder, and George followed it with an even more offensive letter, in which he said he feared he might quote against her Jer. 3 3 (last clause) which reads, "Thou hast a whore's forehead; thou refusest to be ashamed." This led Francis to threaten excommunication, but George yielded and a truce was patched up which lasted for over a year. In Amsterdam George was told that he would be elected elder if he would confess sin in alleging Jer. 3 3 (last clause) against Mrs. J., but he replied that after mature reflection on sea and land he had come to the conclusion that it was not sinful to allege that Scripture against her. Whereupon there were renewed threats of excommunication. Several church meetings followed, the general tone of which is well indicated by the following quotation from Dexter (*Congregationalism as Seen in its Literature*, p. 287):

"George Johnson was then accused of having charged Mrs. Johnson with musk as sin; and he replied that it was the excess and not the use which he condemned. Then they said he charged her with sin in wearing a topish hat. After much debate the church voted that the hat was not topish in nature. G. J. urged that he spake against the hat in her being a pastor's wife, and he in bonds, and not that the hat was simply unlawful in the nature thereof. Whereat the pastor made a syllogism, thus: What is not in the nature thereof topish, that used by any is not topish: the hat in the nature thereof is not topish: *ergo* being used by her it is not topish. G. J. wanted that reduced to writing, whereat the Pastor changed it two or three ways, and G. J. replied that though velvet in its nature were not topish, yet if common mariners should wear such, it would be a token of pride and topishness in them. Also a gilded rapier and a feather are not topish in their nature, neither in a captain to wear them; and yet if a minister should wear them, they would be signs of great vanity, topishness, and lightness in him. The pastor pleaded that differences of circumstances

and means made dress lawful in one which was not in another, that his wife paid for her own clothes, and that such things might lawfully be worn; whereupon one of the members begged him not so to speak lest it should bring in many inconveniences among their wives. Finally the brethren demanded that the gown with the cod-piece breast should be produced that they might decide for themselves upon its indecency; but the Pastor refused. So the matter worried along until both G. J. and the old father who had come over from England to make peace had been excommunicated — Francis Johnson himself pronouncing the sentence against his own father and brother.”

That is a most instructive glimpse into the inner life of a Separatist church, and when in addition we recall the many distressing schisms which rent the same church over matters of the smallest moment, we wonder what would have been the fate of this little bickering company on the lonely and inhospitable coast of New England. In very truth had the Pilgrims been Separatists of this sort the Plymouth colony could not have survived the first winter; but happily the example and oft-repeated teaching of their Leyden pastor had put another spirit in them, as is evident from the report which Bradford gives of the sweet harmony of their united life in Holland, to which also the magistrates of Leyden gave witness; and hence it was that on these shores the much-distressed company held together in mutual love and confidence.

Furthermore, eight years after the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth the first spume-flakes of the great wave of Puritan immigration fell at Salem. Now in England, Puritan and Separatist were at loggerheads and vile epithets were bandied back and forth in the name of the Lord, as if the very devil were in them both. We remember the words of Higginson as the shores of old England faded from his view: “We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England, Farewell, Babylon, Farewell, Rome; but we will say Farewell, dear England, Farewell, the Church of God in England, and all the Christian friends there. We do not go to New England as



Separatists from the Church of England, though we cannot but separate from the corruptions in it; but we go to practise the positive part of church reformation and propagate the Gospel in America." Such an attitude, with the feeling towards the Separatist which it reveals, promises ill for friendly relations between Plymouth and Salem. Yet shortly after landing at Salem that very company of Puritans organized themselves into a church by covenant quite after the Plymouth pattern, and Higginson himself was ordained minister of the church by the church as if he were not already a regularly ordained minister in the Church of England. Moreover, the Plymouth church gave and the Salem church received the right hand of fellowship, and from that time forward the two colonies stood together with consequences of immeasurable importance for the future. What if they had played Kilkenny cats? Would they not have been devoured one of another, even if their savage foes had not annihilated them severally? What then is the explanation of this unlooked-for fellowship? Of course the ocean had actually and literally turned the Puritans into Separatists whether they would or no. The leagues of tossing sea traversed through many weary weeks effected a decisive physical separation. Besides, why talk longer of reforming from within when here there was no without to be reformed. Their occupation as a reforming party within the church was gone, for here they were "the whole thing." What more natural then, since a fresh start had to be made, than to start right, and form out of hand a true Church of Christ after the New Testament model. Robinson had predicted that exactly this would be the course of events, and so it turned out. But deeper than any one of these reasons separately and more significant, I fancy, than all of them together is the fact that the men of Plymouth were of the church of John Robinson. The Amsterdam church of Francis Johnson would have been

in perpetual quarrels among themselves and with the Puritans in Salem. But the advanced Puritans of the Bay and the Semi-Separatists at Plymouth were able to live and work together.

Was it then solely because of John Robinson that this happy result was accomplished? But he never crossed the Atlantic. Was it because he had taught the Pilgrims? But who taught him and who transported his spirit? If I may trot out a little hobby of my own, permit me to say that perhaps the good Leyden pastor learned some of his liberality from certain lay members of his congregation, namely from William Bradford and William Brewster, particularly the latter. Brewster was a man of the world as almost no other of the contemporary Separatists was. He had spent three years in diplomatic service with William Davison, one of which, 1585, was passed in the Netherlands, and both there and also during thirteen years as Master of the Post and caretaker of the Manor at Scrooby, he had learned the ways of men. Moreover, it is expressly stated that he had been in the habit of attending the public services of other than Separatist churches and that Robinson had winked at this before his eyes were permanently open to the legitimacy of the practice. Again, Winslow expressly testified that "if any joining with us . . . held forth separation from the Church of England," Robinson or Brewster would stop them forthwith, showing that we "required no such things at their hands but only to hold faith in Christ Jesus, holiness in the fear of God, and submission to every ordinance and appointment of God, leaving the Church of England to themselves and to the Lord." Both Robinson and Brewster signed the Seven Articles, in the second of which the Leyden Company profess their desire to keep spiritual communion in peace with the Church of England. Hence I strongly suspect that the character of the Plymouth Pilgrims was due quite as much in the last analysis to William Brewster as

to John Robinson. If so, the history of this country was mightily influenced at a critical period by Christian laymen. Certainly it was Samuel Fuller, doctor and deacon of Plymouth, who was the active agent in bringing his colony into friendly relations with Salem and Boston — thus foreshadowing the value of medical missions in the diffusion of Christianity, and perhaps also the means by which eventually Christian unity will be achieved through the leadership of laymen. This would not be the only instance in Christian history in which laymen have taught their professional clerical instructors the ways of a larger, more generous, Christian charity. Indeed, as one distinguished theologian has said with emphasis — Christianity is preëminently a layman's religion, and it is this just because Jesus himself was a layman.



JOHN ROBINSON AND THE BEGINNINGS  
OF THE PILGRIM MOVEMENT

FREDERICK JAMES POWICKE

STOCKPORT, ENGLAND

The scope of this article is strictly limited. It takes no account of the great issues, social, national, and international, which, in the course of time, flowed from the few simple folk "in the north parts" of England about Scrooby and Gainsborough who obeyed what they believed to be a divine impulse.

Others far more competent for the purpose have already dealt with, or will deal with, these. Nor does it do more than touch the details of the life into which the exiles passed at Amsterdam and Leyden. For on these, Dr. Dexter and his son — to mention but two of the workers in this field<sup>1</sup> — may almost be said to have spoken the last word. Nor does it follow the Pilgrims into the new world where they struck root with such heroic fortitude, except so far as is required to correct one or two somewhat inveterate mistakes. It is, in fact, limited to the man who, beyond any one else, was the chief spiritual influence in those earliest pioneers whose character and ideals imparted a permanent direction to the development of New England. At the same time, while relating the substance of what is known of Robinson, I have tried to state the truth with regard to the circumstances in which the Pilgrim movement took its start; and if, in so doing, it has seemed necessary to criticize adversely the conclusions of one writer in particular, my excuse must be that his narrative has been accepted, in some high quarters, as that of an authority on the subject whose word is final. It is not by any means final, as the sequel, I think, will show.

<sup>1</sup> See *The England and Holland of the Pilgrims*, 1906. Bk. VI, chap 3.

## I

It is known that Robinson's early home and probably his birthplace was Sturton-en-le-Steeple<sup>2</sup> — a village on the Nottingham side of the Trent, some five miles southwest of Gainsborough on the Lincoln side, and ten miles southeast of Scrooby. His father, also named John, seems to have been a yeoman, or owner and tiller of his own farm; and from the contents of his will as well as from those of his wife<sup>3</sup> we may judge him to have been fairly well-to-do.

To the same village belonged another yeoman apparently of greater estate, named Alexander White. Thus, the Whites and Robinsons were neighbors, and their young people grew up together. In the case of two of them, at least, companionship produced affection; for Bridget, second daughter of the Whites, became Robinson's wife. Robinson was born about 1575.<sup>4</sup> The first seventeen years of his life are a blank. Nothing is clear before April 9, 1592, the date of his admission to Corpus Christi or Benet College, Cambridge. His status as a sizar would not be free from hardships; but we may presume that he faced them with the cheerful courage of an enthusiast for learning. His career, at any rate, was not undistinguished. It extended over nearly twelve years. Besides proceeding to the usual degrees of B.A. and M.A. he was made Fellow of his college and "Prælector Graecus" in 1598, and "Decanus" in 1600. A fellowship entailed ordination, and by 1602 Robinson had become Priest. After a further two years of college life there

<sup>2</sup> This discovery was made by Rev. W. H. Burgess, B.A. (author of John Smith the Se-Baptist) and communicated to the *Christian Life* (February, 1911), London, and to the *Christian Register* (Boston).

<sup>3</sup> Wills in District Registry at York. Vol. 33, fo. 236; vol. 34, fo. 324. Cited by Burgess in his *John Smith, etc.*, p. 317. Mr. Champlin Burrage prints Mr. Robinson's will in Appendix D. Vol. I, pp. 326, 327 of his *Early English Dissenters*, 1912.

<sup>4</sup> An inference from the fact that when admitted to be a member of Leyden University on August 5, 1615, he was in his 39th year.

occurred what seems an abrupt change;<sup>5</sup> he resigned his fellowship and on February 15, 1603, was married to Bridget White at Greasley<sup>6</sup> in Nottingham.

The home to which he took her was in Norwich, where, for some short time before, he had been installed as a minister of St. Andrew's Church.<sup>7</sup> It may be that he was indebted for the appointment to the nomination of Jegon, the Bishop of Norwich, whom he had known as Master of Corpus Christi; but if so, it is not likely that the bishop knew of Robinson's already strong tendency away from the church. Just when and how this originated cannot be traced with precision. There was, however, quite enough to account for it in his Cambridge environment — not to mention the Puritan influences which may have been around him in his home. Thomas Cartwright (1535–1603) though a proscribed man, was still a name of power. Francis Johnson (1562–1618), though now a leader of the Brownists, was not forgotten. The Puritan fervor which conduced to Robert Browne's (1550?–1633) popularity as a preacher in 1579 had by no means died out. It was aglow in Emmanuel College, and, with less heat, in St. John's. William Perkins (1558–1602), moreover, at Great St. Andrew's was a lecturer of uncompromising Puritan temper. So too, on the whole, was his successor, Paul

<sup>5</sup> Might there be a connection between this and the agitation which arose about the Millenary Petition and led Cambridge (June 9, 1603) to pass a "grace that whoever in that University should attack the doctrine or discipline of the Church of England should be suspended from all degrees already taken and forbidden all others"? Dexter, E. H., p. 337.

<sup>6</sup> An extensive parish about ten miles west of Nottingham. Why this place should have been chosen for the marriage seems to be accounted for by the fact (recently brought to light) that one of Bridget White's brothers occupied a farm in the parish. For entry of the marriage, see Phillimore and Blagg's Nottinghamshire Parish Registers. Vol. VIII, p. 99. Robinson and his wife are entered as Mr. and Mistress.

<sup>7</sup> He was not himself a member of St. Andrews "having" (he says) "my house . . . within another parish and my children baptized there." Burrage, N. F., p. 17. For names of his family, see Dexter's E. H. P., p. 632. Two of his six children were born in Norwich, John and Bridget. Isaac, the third, was 92 years old in 1702, which gives 1610 as the year of his birth (Arber, p. 160).



Burgess. Nor must we forget the presence at Cambridge of John Smith (d. 1612) — sizar, graduate, and Fellow of Christ's College. For six years at least he was Robinson's contemporary. He, likewise, was from the north country. Nay, they may have been known to each other as natives of the same village and schoolfellows.<sup>8</sup> Smith, even as late as 1604, was not yet a Separatist; but he was a decided Puritan, and it is most natural to suppose that the two would often, or sometimes, meet and that Smith by reason of his riper knowledge would find in his younger companion a respectful listener. Robinson, in fact, owed much to Smith, and never disowned the debt — however widely or sharply he came to differ. And the debt began at Cambridge. From Cambridge to Norwich was a passage from one Puritan centre to another. There Robert Browne had constituted his church in 1581. There a remnant of that church survived in 1602 and formed a climax to lower degrees of "nonconformity in the city" or its neighborhood. St. Andrew's Church for example, as is evident by the character of its vicars,<sup>9</sup> had Puritan preferences and is said<sup>10</sup> to have purchased the right of presentation in order to indulge them. Robinson calls himself minister, not vicar, though he may have been vicar all the same.

Mr. Burrage suggests that his position was practically Congregationalist. But this is going too far.<sup>11</sup> St. Andrew's by its purchase of the right to present may have been

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Burgess writes in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 2, 1916, p. 176, "I have . . . come to the conclusion that he was the fourth son of one 'John Smyth,' yeoman, of Sturton-le-Steeple. . . . There are several pieces of evidence which point to this young John Smith as being the man, none of them, indeed, decisive but weighty in their cumulative effect."

<sup>9</sup> Mr. John More, vicar in Robert Browne's time, was a Puritan — so was Mr. John Yates, vicar after 1616.

<sup>10</sup> Burrage, *N. F.*, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Burrage, *ibid.*, p. 21. Robinson himself says: "The way by which the ministers of St. Andrew's enter is not the plain way of the Lord but the crooked path of a Lord Bishop's ordination and approbation and of a Patron's presentation, yea whether the people will or no." *Ibid.*, p. 19.

able to secure members inclined to omit or change some ceremonies and preach sound doctrine, but it was no less a part of the established order and subject to episcopal rule. And Robinson was content to have it so for a time. Joseph Hall (1574–1656) says<sup>12</sup> he took his first avowed step towards Separatism when he “refused the Prelacy” and his second when he “branded the ceremonies.” This might seem an inversion of the historic truth. Usually it had been the ceremonies that were first questioned, then the prelacy. But the tyranny of the prelates had thrust itself to the forefront of the Puritan outlook by Robinson’s time, and so their removal had really come to seem the first step in the way of a radical reform. By the middle of 1604, prelatical influence with the king and in Convocation had brought to pass the new canons — one hundred and forty-one of them — which aimed to reconstruct the church, and incidentally to strangle every sign of dissent. No wonder if Robinson was moved thereby to declare his “refusal of the Prelacy.” Then when he refused subscription to the canons, some time after December, 1604, by so doing he virtually “branded the ceremonies.” He paid the immediate penalty in suspension. As a married man, with one or two children, the consequent suffering could not be simply his own, and he had to seek some other means of living. Mr. Hall reports that he sought it by applying for the mastership of St. Giles’s Hospital, and, failing this, for a lease to serve as city preacher.<sup>13</sup> The same kind pen lays it down as something certain that if the application had succeeded, there would have been an end to his thoughts of separation. This is mere slander. But it is true that failure led to his leaving both city and church.

<sup>12</sup> In his *Common Apologie against the Brownists* . . . Hall, future Bishop of Exeter and Norwich, had probably known Robinson at Cambridge, and was now (1610) vicar of Waltham, Essex.

<sup>13</sup> A *Common Apologie of the Church of England*, p. 145. Cf. the case of John Smith as Preacher to the City of Lincoln, 1600–02.

The landmarks for the next year or two are few and faint. What there are suggest a state of mental strife. Our clearest glimpse of him is at Cambridge, where he had come in hope to find satisfaction for a troubled heart, and where in fact he seems to have found it. For on a Sabbath, going to hear Laurence Chaderton (1536?–1640) at St. Clemens in the morning, and Paul Baynes (d. 1617) at Great St. Andrew's in the afternoon, both these preachers (as he deemed, providentially) so expounded their subjects as to reinforce the "very reasons," which to his mind, made most surely for the last step.<sup>14</sup> Before his visit he had been "amongst some company of the separation,"<sup>15</sup> perhaps at Gainsborough, and in "exercising," or preaching to them, had "renounced his former ministry." But he was still haunted by misgivings, and the Cambridge "experience" may be taken as marking the hour of final decision. Then he returned to Gainsborough or Scrooby. By this time, 1607, the people of the Separation had become "two bands," though still one church. Their accepted pastor was John Smith, late preacher to the city of Lincoln, who had come to Gainsborough early in 1606. His treatment by the High Commission (in 1606) drove him forward,<sup>16</sup> through nine months of doubt, to the conclusion that the Church of England was not the Church of Christ. There were those in the town and district who inclined to the same view. These—at the end of 1606 or in the beginning of 1607—he gathered together "as the Lord's free people" into a "covenant," viz., "to walk in all his ways made known, or to be made known, unto men, according to their best endeavours, whatsoever it should cost them, the Lord assisting them."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> P. 20 of Robinson's *Manumission*, 1615.

<sup>15</sup> P. 29 of Ames's *Second Manuduction*, 1625.

<sup>16</sup> Whitley, J. S. Vol. I, pp. lvi, lvii.

<sup>17</sup> Burgess, Smith, p. 85. The terms of the covenant are reported by Bradford (History, p. 13). If Smith indited the form, he might be indebted for the substance to Francis Johnson or even Robert Browne.



This broad and simple formula, which certainly emanated from Smith, was the basis of the new movement and its bond of fellowship. Robinson took it gladly, and wished for nothing better. With merely verbal alterations and extensions it served him and his people to the end. Why, on his return, he chose to cast in his lot with the Scrooby rather than the Gainsborough group is not clear. Perhaps because those at Scrooby had most need of him, or perhaps because they were more congenial to him. For it was the group which included William Brewster, William Bradford, and Richard Clifton — “the grave and reverend preacher who by his pains and diligence had done much good and under God had been the means of the conversion of many.” But neither Clifton nor Robinson held office in the group. If the two groups made up the church, with Smith as pastor, there would be no need or desire to elect another. The need only arose at a later time when a cleavage between the two groups took place at Amsterdam. While at Scrooby, Robinson’s relation to the group, as also Clifton’s, was that of an unofficial preacher.

## II

When Smith appeared at Gainsborough and Robinson at Scrooby, the way had been prepared for them. Bradford relates how “by the travail and diligence of some godly and zealous preachers, and God’s blessing on their labours, as in other places of the land, so in the north parts, many became enlightened by the word of God” (*History*, pp. 11, 12). Before 1849, when Mr. Joseph Hunter issued his *Collections concerning the Early History of the Founders of New Plymouth*, the vague statement — “in the north parts” — excited mere conjecture. Bradford’s further statement that the north parts meant “sundry villages and towns, some in Nottingham, some of Lincolnshire and some of Yorkshire where they border nearest

together," narrowed the field, but gave no definite clue. It was Hunter who identified Austerfield in Yorkshire as the native place of Bradford, and Scrooby Manor, in Nottinghamshire, as the home of William Brewster and the Separatist meeting-house (pp. 8-11). Other identifications followed naturally and cleared up the question of locality once for all. It was Hunter also who first illustrated Bradford's incidental reference to Richard Clifton by particulars of his ministerial career and family connections (pp. 18 ff., more fully in the revised edition of 1854, pp. 40-98). It was he again, who annotated the general reference to "godly and zealous preachers" by directing attention to such Puritan preachers of the neighborhood as Thomas Toller of Sheffield (p. 20, and in 1854 ed., pp. 48, 49), Richard Bernard of Worksop (pp. 20, 21, and in 1854 ed., pp. 35-40), Robert Gifford of Laughton-en-le-Northen, adjoining Worksop (1854 ed., pp. 49, 50), and Hugh Bromehead of North Wheatley (1854 ed., pp. 51, 52 and App. No. 4, pp. 163-172). Finally, it was Hunter who drew out the story of William Brewster (pp. 21-39, cf. 1854 ed., pp. 53-88) and of William Bradford (pp. 44-51, cf. 1854 ed., pp. 99-120). At the same time, he depicted the physical features of the country (called the Basset Law) and the general character of its population; the prevalence of Roman Catholic religious houses; and the *a priori* unlikelihood, therefore, that it should be the scene of a Puritan harvest (pp. 15, 16; 1854 ed., pp. 24-28). In fine, Hunter had good right to claim that the new facts which he brought to light have "changed the face of the whole history of the movement, so long as the actors in it remained in England" (Preface to 1854 ed.).

Later research has somewhat enlarged the number of "new facts," particularly in relation to Robinson and Smith; but to him is due the praise of a pioneer who cleared a path where there seemed an impasse, and evoked an impulse to follow it up which accounts for the work of

the Dexters and many another. Among the facts brought to light by Hunter was one which he found in a return made to the Exchequer by the Archbishop of York, Toby Matthew on the 13th of November, 1608, to the effect that Richard Jackson, William Brewster, and Robert Rochester, all of Scrooby in the County of Nottingham, Brownists or Separatists, were liable "for a fine of £20 apiece (p. 131, 1854 ed.).

This he speaks of as the single instance of legal proceedings against the "Basset-Law Nonconformists" which he had come across. Dexter (p. 320, note) cited another from the MS. records of the ecclesiastical court at York. This was the case of Joan, wife of Thomas Helwys of Broxtowe, with regard to whom action was taken on January 26, 1607-8, and again later in the same year. After commitment to York Castle, she was brought before the High Commissioners, and, declining to incriminate herself (by the oath *ex officio*) was sent back to prison in the castle; where probably she remained till in due course she was banished the realm. John Drews and Thomas Jessop, "for refusing to take the oath according to law," were remanded to prison at the same time and with the same fate (Burgess, *Story of John Smith*, p. 116). A further case was that of "Gervase Nevyle (or Nevile) of Scrowbie," described as "a very dangerous schismatical Separatist, Brownist, and irreligious subject." He appeared before the ecclesiastical Court at York, on March 22, 1607-8,<sup>18</sup> and, after refusal to take oath and make answer, or to recognize the authority of the Archbishop,

<sup>18</sup> He was arraigned first, by the High Commissioners on November 10, 1607, and committed "to jail in the Castle of York for trial and further proceedings." These took place on March 22, 1608, and, meanwhile he had remained a prisoner; for the indictment on the latter date runs — "Gervase Nevile of York Castle, Brownist or Separatist." Dr. Usher (*The Pilgrims and their History*) seems not to be aware of the trial on March 22, else he could hardly say (p. 261) "Neville was permitted to testify without taking the oath and though committed to prison for a time was, after no long confinement, released without further examination or trial." "Indeed Neville was handled with considerable charity" (p. 21).



he was delivered by "strait-warrant to the hands, ward, and strait custody of the Keeper of His Majesty's Castle of York, not permitting him to have any liberty or conference with any without special license" (Brown, *P. E.*, pp. 94, 95).

In a book entitled *The Pilgrims and their History* by Roland G. Usher, Ph.D. (1918), the writer says: "It must be owned that from what we know of the activity of the High Commission elsewhere, the treatment the Scrooby congregation received was far from severe." There are a number of slight inaccuracies in the context of this summary judgment which do not predispose the reader to receive it with implicit faith. One has been indicated in a previous note; a second is the writing of Richard Johnson for Richard Jackson, and the adding of Francis Jessop of Worksop to the list of those summoned in December, 1607;<sup>19</sup> a third is the saying that no other persons than the five named were accused of Separatism, Baroism, (*sic*?) — apparently in ignorance of Joan Helwys, John Drews, and Thomas Jessop; and a fourth is implied in the assertion that in these cases (the five), the failure of the authorities to pursue them with "fines, excommunications, and attachments," shows that prosecution was initiated not by them but by some private individual. For there was no such failure, if it be true that an attachment was awarded to William Blanchard to apprehend Richard Jackson and William Brewster, and that each of these was fined £20. True, the authorities did not go the length of excommunication. But what would have happened if Brewster had not escaped? <sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> I find no other mention of him in this connection, nor does Dr. Usher give any reference. According to Hunter, Francis Jessop seems to have resided at Heyton or Tilne, Scrooby. It was his nephew, Wortley Jessop, who resided at Scrofton in the parish of Worksop. Collections, ed. 1854, pp. 126, 127.

<sup>20</sup> One or two other slips may be mentioned. Thus (p. 4) Scrooby is said to be fifty miles north of Lincoln instead of about sixteen miles northwest, and (p. 26) it is said, "Two years before (i.e., in 1606) Smyth's congregation had gone from their own little district to Holland," although the church was not gathered before the end of 1606, and

These, however, are trifles compared with the mistake involved in Dr. Usher's general standpoint. He may be said not unfairly to have taken up a brief for the ecclesiastical authorities and against the Puritans, against the Separatists especially. The outcome of this is insistence upon three remarkable propositions. The first is that what persecution befell the Scrooby congregation before 1607 was occasioned entirely by hostile neighbors. "From the authorities at London and from the ecclesiastics at York had thus far come neither reproaches nor interference." The reason for this lay in the tolerant temper of Archbishop Hutton and their own social or numerical insignificance. There came a change for the worse only with the accession of Toby Matthew, 1607. Even then severity began and ended with the five cases aforesaid. So says Dr. Usher. And I do not deny Archbishop Hutton's tolerant temper nor its effect in sparing the Scrooby people. But their comparative immunity had other causes as well. In part, it was due to the fact that the canons were not enforced in the northern province until the Convocation of York had adopted them, and that this was not done before March 10, 1606.<sup>21</sup> So the question is, what did the authorities do after that date? And the answer

Smith could still write himself "Pastor of the church at Gainsborough" in 1607 (see Letter of Smith to Bernard. Whitley, S. Vol. II, p. 331) and both companies were in Holland by August, 1608. Dr. Usher's great learning and competence, as exhibited particularly in his *Reconstruction of the English Church* — a work for which every serious student of the subject is thankful — appear to fail him whenever he touches on the Separatists. For a glaring example I may refer to Introduction (p. xxiv) of his *Presbyterian Movement in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (1905) where he says, "It was in 1585-86, when there came a sharp discussion over the details of Church government, that Brown, Harrison, Wright, Greenwood and others whom the Congregationalists regard as their prototypes separated from the movement." The Brown here mentioned is (on p. xxxvi) identified with a member of the Oxford Classis. Evidently there is confusion. Neither this Brown nor Thomas Harrison (the noted Hebraist of Cambridge) nor even Robert Wright was a Separatist. Browne and Harrison the Separatists were named Robert, and the first Separatist church was set up by Robert Browne at Norwich in 1581.

<sup>21</sup> *Synodalis*, Cardwell. Vol. I, pp. 164-166, note; p. 245, note. Cf. Whitley, S., Introduction, pp. 1-11.

seems clear that they did their utmost to make the state of Nonconformists unbearable. John Smith (see above) found this and was driven by it to the last extremity of protest; Richard Bernard of Worksop found it and had his spirit broken thereby;<sup>22</sup> while as to the people generally, could words be more explicit than those of Bradford (*History*, p. 14)? "After these things they could not long continue in any peaceable condition, but were hunted and persecuted on every side, so as their former afflictions were but as flea-bitings in comparison of these which now came upon them. For some were taken and clapt up in prison, others had their houses beset and watched night and day, and hardly escaped their hands; and the most were fain to flie and leave their howses and habitations, and the means of their livelehood."

Such was the experience which Dr. Usher calls lenient. Moreover, according to the same unimpeachable witness, it was the climax of what had been going on for years. "The work of God was no sooner manifested in them [the local Puritans] but presently they were scoffed and scorned by the prophane multitude, and ye ministers urged with ye yoke of subscription, or els must be silenced; and ye poore people were so vexed with apparators and pursuivants, and ye commissarie courts as truly their affliction was not small, which, notwithstanding, they bore sundrie years with much patience" (*History*, p. 12).

But Dr. Usher's contention is that all the trouble thus related — except the five cases — was of private origin. It was the work of malicious and treacherous "relatives and neighbors." He asserts this as if he knew, and speaks of it as a most important fact, and dilates upon it in romantic strain (p. 18). But he cites no authority nor does he seem to have any outside the passage last quoted from

<sup>22</sup> He almost "separated" — at first he showed the greatest eagerness to go forward and he actually refused to subscribe — but he soon sued for "reinstatement" in ways which excited Smith's scorn. Whitley, S. Vol. II, pp. 335, 336, 370.

Bradford.<sup>23</sup> Here indeed it is said that the "prophane multitude" scoffed and scorned. It was growing to be a fashion with the "prophane multitude" so to behave towards the Puritan. But was it the profane multitude that urged ministers with the yoke of subscription or silenced them, or vexed the poor people with apparitors and pursuivants and the commissary courts? At any rate, does the profane multitude stand for relatives and neighbours? Are we to imagine these to have been so hostile that there was no living in peace on account of their daily nagging, scoffing, and deriding? Are we to think of them too as traitors, scheming continually to set the officers of law in motion? Dr. Usher would have us think so. But he adduces no evidence — either positive or negative — to bear him out.

2. Even less credible is the assertion that there is no substance in the traditional charge of harshness on the part of the Bishops against the Puritans. "As a matter of fact the Puritan clergy were not persecuted." This categorical reversal of what might have seemed a firmly established judgment is based on facts (says Dr. Usher) which go to show "that the overwhelming majority of the Puritans accepted the established church and remained members of it, read its Prayer Book, and performed voluntarily its ceremonies." Of the sixty Puritan clergy who were temporarily deprived or suspended in 1604-5, "the great majority soon conformed, accepted the tests prescribed by Bancroft and continued to preach in their parishes without molestation." We are asked, therefore, to conclude that Bancroft's régime was not "one of great harshness and injustice." The small number of the ejected proves it, and the Scrooby people in flying to Holland were flying from a shadow. "Indeed the Puritans and Bishops

<sup>23</sup> Unless it be Cotton Mather's *Magnalia*. Bk. II, sec. 3 (as cited by Dexter, E. H. P., p. 391) where it is said that Bradford encountered the "wrath of his uncles" and "the scoff of his neighbours." Mather is not a good witness; but even if he were, what he says refers only to Bradford.



taunted the Pilgrims with running away from a persecution which did not exist."

All this strikes one as a strange misreading of the facts. The king's threat to harry the Puritans out of the land is certain;<sup>24</sup> Bancroft's jubilant sympathy with that attitude is certain;<sup>25</sup> canon thirty-six of the one hundred and forty-one agreed upon by Bancroft and the rest of the bishops and clergy, in their Synod of London in 1603, is certain; the proclamation enjoining conformity to the form of the service of God established (July, 1604) is certain. Bancroft's circular letter (December 22, 1604) to the bishops of the southern province, urging them to a stringent execution of the king's command, is certain.<sup>26</sup> It is certain also that petitions from disaffected Puritans, cleric and lay, beseeching consideration and tolerance, were treated as seditious and their bearers or promoters in some cases imprisoned.<sup>27</sup> No less certain is it that resentment, deep and widespread, was in this way evoked, chiefly against the prelates "who have reviled and disgraced both in Pulpit and in Press, their brethren"; and have "also suspended, deprived, degraded, and imprisoned them, yea, caused them to be turned out of house and home, deny'd them all benefit of law, and used them with such contempt and contumely as if they were not worthy to live upon the face of the earth."<sup>28</sup> Yet there was no persecution!<sup>29</sup> How could there be, argues Dr.

<sup>24</sup> Usher, *Reconstruction of the English Church*. Vol. I, p. 327.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> The circular enclosed a letter from the Privy Council to say that the time of grace notified "the 16th day of July last," for the recalcitrants having now expired, it is the king's firm determination that since advice has not prevailed "authority shall compel."

<sup>27</sup> Whitley, *S.* Vol. I, p. li.

<sup>28</sup> A Christian and modest offer of a most indifferent conference. Pamphlet by some "of the late silenced and deprived ministers." Imprinted 1606. Rylands Library (uncatalogued).

<sup>29</sup> Dr. Usher's own words may be quoted against him: "The severe penalties attached" (to the canons of 1604) "showed that the canons were meant to be obeyed, that a new day had dawned, when there should not only be law but penalties for break-

Usher, seeing that in a year or two Puritan clamor and revolt died away? One might argue much the same from the effects upon a stricken country of a tyrant's conquest. He makes a desolation and calls it peace. Granted that the Puritans became acquiescent, did they become so willingly? Let their uprising a generation later supply the answer. They became acquiescent because, for the time being, the severity of the pressure upon them was more than they could bear. Only a few here and there disclosed an endurance which refused to be broken, and who were these? They were the people of Gainsborough and Scrooby. Their constancy is glorified by the Puritan surrender. Starting from the same grounds, they advanced to all the successive positions which these involved and took the consequences. That is the plain truth of the matter. Separation was the last step, and its consequences were provided by the act of April, 1593, which decreed that "if any person above sixteen years of age . . . shall obstinately refuse" to go to some authorized church, he, "being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be committed to prison, there to remain without bail or main prize"; shall be kept there three months, and, if still obstinate, shall then "upon his corporal oath" "abjure this realm of England and all other the Queen Majesty's dominions forever"; and if, having so sworn, he "shall not go to such haven and within such time as is before appointed," or, "shall return into Her Majesty's dominions without Her Majesty's special licence," he "shall be adjudged a felon" and die a felon's death. Furthermore, "all his goods and chattels" shall be forfeit to Her Majesty forever, and "all his lands" during his own life.<sup>30</sup>

ing it and a coercive force sufficient to exact them from the guilty." Reconstruction of the English Church. Vol. I, p. 383.

<sup>30</sup> An act to retain the Queen's subjects in obedience. See Prothero, *Select Statutes*, 1558-1625, pp. 89-92. This act was continued by 39 Eliz. 18; 43 Eliz. 9; 1 James I, 25; 21 James I, 28.

The Scrooby and Gainsborough Separatists could evade this act only by secret flight, as those of the London Church had done in the previous decade. Can it be said that if they had chosen to stand their ground the act would not have been enforced? No one acquainted with the facts will so say. The act was enforced — as often as its victims were caught. It might not be enforced to death by public execution; but it was enforced by a slow death in prison.<sup>31</sup> What a flash of light is thrown by the following extract from Thomas Helwys's *Mystery of Iniquity* (1612).<sup>32</sup> It is addressed to the bishops:

“Let us persuade you in fear to God and shame to men to cast away all these courses we shall now mention. Do not when a poor soul by violence is brought before you, to speak his conscience in the profession of his religion to his God — do not first implore the oath *ex officio*. O, most wicked course! And if he will not yield to that, they imprison him closer. O, horrible severity! And if he will not be forced by imprisonment, then examine him on divers articles, without oath, to see if he may be entrapped anyway. O, grievous impiety! And if any piece of advantage (either in word or writing or by witness) can be gotten, turn the magistrates' sword upon him, or take his life. O, bloody cruelty! If no advantage can be found, get him banished out of his natural country and from his father's house; let him live or starve, it matters not. O, unnatural compassionateness without pity! Let these courses be far from you, for there is no show of grace, religion, nor humanity in these courses. This is to lie in wait for blood, and to lay snares secretly to take the simple to slay him.”

3. Dr. Usher's third proposition is that “the Pilgrims *voluntarily* left England” (p. 26). As there was nothing in their treatment which compelled them to leave, why did they go? He answers, because they had reached a state of mind to which “England was unclean” (p. 23). They must, therefore, depart for their souls' sake. “It was

<sup>31</sup> In 1596 (see Preface to the Confession of Faith of certain people living in Exile, of that year) it was recorded that “twenty souls (including aged men and women) have perished in the prisons within the city of London only (besides other places of the land) and that of late years.”

<sup>32</sup> Quoted by Burgess, Smith, p. 284.

dangerous to remain there longer, for those who would worship God in all sincerity and purity must guard against the pollution and contamination of the Beast " (p. 23). Their " vital objection to the Established Church was not so much its activity in persecution as its existence. . . . It was all a relic of Paganism, there was no warrant in Scripture for any of it. . . . To remain in contact with it was to risk defilement " (pp. 23, 24). Dr. Usher confounds physical with spiritual contact. Dr. Joseph Hall, Robinson's first assailant, did the same, and was told by Robinson to realize the difference. There was no reason (said he) to separate from England in order to separate from England's church, any more than to escape from Amsterdam in order to avoid its heresies and immoralities. Merely to be let alone was enough. In Amsterdam they were in the world, but not forced to be of it. Heretics and sinners of every sort might be around them, but they were not made to have fellowship with them in worship. In England it was otherwise. There the laws compelled them to be in and of a church which they adjudged to be Babylon. They could not come out of the church except by coming out of their " dear native land." Just that was the distressing grievance — a grievance which would have ceased at once if persecution had ceased. It is a libel to say that in their eyes " there was no one left in England with whom the Pilgrims might hope to have communion. . . . All was wrong, all was uncongenial, unclean, and from it they fled " (p. 25). They were no such churls or Pharisees. But for the severity of the laws and the rigor with which they were administered, it is past all doubt that Robinson, Brewster, and the rest would have rejoiced to stay at home and to let their witness to the " truth " speak for itself. It is one thing to say that they had no right to expect so much tolerance. It is quite another to suggest that so much was offered to them and spurned. It is not " a great



error to stress the hostility of the church toward them and say that they were harried from the land " (p. 22). It is the simple fact.

### III

By May, 1609, Robinson and his people were settled at Leyden. They had gone there after a few months at Amsterdam — months of disillusionment. For the sister church of Johnson and Ainsworth was not what they had hoped. Its principles were their own, but not its temper. This had become excited by controversy and enflamed by personal quarrels. There was consequently too little scope for that quiet growth of Christian character and life which to Robinson was the church's chief end. In addition, there was John Smith with his ultra-scrupulous conscience, so keen for the truth but so unable (at present) to mark off what really mattered from what was of comparative unimportance. Already (1608) he had stepped forward with his (six) *Differences of the Separation*, and was exalting them into a touchstone of communion. The effect was to kindle a flame in which love and peace could not live. In the particular points at issue Robinson, on the whole, may have agreed rather with Smith than with Johnson. But they were points which he did not wish his people to agitate. They were not trivial, but they were not essential. The essential things were inward and spiritual. He looked round, therefore, for some quiet resting place where the Church in its worship might attend to these without distraction. This, I am sure, is nearer the truth than to say, with Dr. Usher, that Robinson and his people " decided to seek some place where there were neither heretics nor English, some place where they should live as nearly as might be alone and observe together the ordinances of God whose perpetuation was the prime motive of their exodus from Scrooby " (p. 33).

We have no reports of Robinson's ordinary discourses. His literary record is made up for the most part of con-

troversial writings; and this may easily give the impression that controversial topics were those which absorbed his ministry. But the impression is corrected if we bear in mind that the controversies were of strictly occasional origin. Each was called forth by specific attacks which, in justice to his cause and his congregation he did not feel at liberty to ignore. Moreover, it is clear that he felt constrained to put all his strength into the fray when once he had become engaged; and it is not strange if sometimes (in the manner of the day) he wasted his strength and weakened his argument by violent language. But even so moderation was the prevailing note of his writing, nor did he either love or seek controversy. Hence it is difficult to imagine him engaging his hearers week by week with a defense of "ordinances." It is much easier to imagine him taking the "ordinances" for granted as mercies to be enjoyed with thanksgiving, and devoting himself usually to such subjects of moral and spiritual interest as are treated of in his *Essays*. Indeed, every one of these, as to substance, might well have been a sermon, and lets us deeper into the habitual mind of the man than any of his polemical work. "Disputations in religion," he says in one place,

"are sometimes necessary, but always dangerous; drawing the best spirits into the head from the heart, and leaving it either empty of all, or too full of fleshly zeal and passion if extraordinary care be not taken still to supply and fill it anew with pious affections towards God and loving towards men" (*Essays*, VII).

"Pious affections towards God and loving towards men"—this double aim pervades most of his *Essays*. Does it not indicate a true conception of his weekly homilies? The men and women who looked up to him from the benches in the big room of his house were mostly simple laboring folk, laboring and heavy-laden. They looked up for bread of the kind that would turn to inward comfort, strength, and light. Their daily life was hard and made

them hungry for such bread. May we not regard it as a sign of his wisdom and love in breaking it for them that, unlike the bickering church at Amsterdam, they dwelt in peace to the end of his days, and nourished a wealth of manly virtues which enabled them to survive alike the trials of their lot in Leyden and the rigors of their experience in the new world? Sound doctrine was good, right ordinances of worship were good, but both were means to an end, viz., Christian lives, and the Leyden pastor never lost sight of this. His reward appeared in men and women whose Christian lives were of the heroic strain, and became his "living epistle" to the world.

#### IV

Robinson lived at Leyden from May, 1609, to his death on March 1, 1625. On one occasion there is a glimpse of him at Rotterdam along with some other members of the church who attended Mr. Brewer so far, on his ominous journey to England;<sup>33</sup> and of course he may have made many other excursions from Leyden. But the inference *e silentio* is that he "dwelt among his own people" in studious seclusion, except for the pastoral duties which were a part of his proper work. According to Bradford "he taught" his people "thrice a week"; and, if his weekly sermons or lectures brought home to them his "singular abilities in Divine things", they did so because of the many hours of thought and prayer which went to their making. Probably his appointment as pastor took place at Amsterdam,<sup>34</sup> while William Brewster was "called

<sup>33</sup> Sir William Zouche to Sir Dudley Carleton, Rotterdam, Saturday, November 18, 1619: "About ten of the clock (last night) Master Brewer arrived, conveyed hither by the Beadle of the University, Master [John] Robinson and Master Keble [John Keble] accompanied by two other of his friends: their names, I think, are not worth the asking." Arber, S. P. F., p. 224.

<sup>34</sup> See Preface to the Treatise of Religious Communion (Ashton, Vol. III, p. 103), where Robinson says he was "excepted against" by some of John Smith's people, when he was "chosen into office in this (Leyden) Church." This could only have happened at Amsterdam.

and chosen " elder <sup>35</sup> on an early date at Leyden (*History*, p. 24). Under their guidance — double in function but single in aim and spirit — the church " grew in knowledge and other gifts and graces of the spirit of God, and lived together in peace and love and holiness; and many came unto them from divers part of England, so as they grew a great congregation " (*Ibid.*, p. 24).

Moreover, though he never sought great things for himself, great influence came to him in the city. Leyden, with its young university, was the centre of a chronic and bitter conflict between Calvinists and Arminians. Polyander for the former and Episcopius for the latter divided " the students and other learned men " into a mutual hostility so great " that few of the disciples of the one would hear the other teach." Robinson, though a high Calvinist, was not a mere partisan. " He went constantly to hear their readings [or lectures] and heard the one as well as the other." Also, in " sundry disputes " he intervened to such effect that " he began to be terrible to the Arminians." In fine, he was induced — much against his wish — to stand up in set debate with Episcopius, who " put forth his best strength," but, according to Bradford, was put " to an apparent non plus . . . in a great and public audience." This occurred more than once, and " procured him much honour and respect from those learned men and others who loved the truth " (*History*, p. 28). Robinson was already a member of the university, and it is hinted that but for the fear of " giving offence to the State of England " some office, presumably as teacher, might have been found for him.

Thus amid tokens of local favor and the warm affection of his people nine years went by. Then there came a change. The fact had to be faced that the church, though

<sup>35</sup> Deacons also were appointed, but not a teacher nor a widow or deaconess — which is remarkable in view of Robinson's Appendix to Mr. Perkins' six principles of Christian Religion, questions 12-17, Robinson's works. Vol. III, pp. 429, 430, Ashton's ed.



united and prosperous, was suffering a certain loss. Conditions of life were hard and deterred many of the homeland from coming or adhering to them. "Some preferred and chose the prisons in England rather than liberty in Holland with these afflictions." Among themselves also many "in the best and strength of their years," despite "a resolute courage," were sinking into a "premature old age," while the young were robbed of their youthfulness. Worse still, there were some of the latter who, "getting the reins off their necks," ran away from the daily round of "heavy labours." "Some became soldiers, others took upon them far voyages by sea and others some worse courses, tending to dissoluteness, and the danger of their souls, to the great grief of their parents and the dishonour of God" (*History*, pp. 30-32).<sup>36</sup> In short, it seemed probable that continuance at Leyden spelt a gradual approach to extinction. So, warned thus by "the grave mistris Experience . . . those prudent governors [Robinson and Brewster], with sundrie of ye sagest members, begane both deeply to apprehend their present dangers and wisely to foresee ye future and thinke of timly remedy" (*History*, p. 29). There is no need here to recount how the remedy was attempted, delayed, and at length accomplished. It is enough to remark that the final issue from a long series of difficulties was not a little due to the pastor's Christian temper, sagacity, and tact. His

<sup>36</sup> Winslow adds as other reasons of unrest: (1) that they felt it grievous to live from under the protection of the State of England; (2) that there was a likelihood of losing the English language, the English names, and the English type of education; (3) that they were conscious of inability "to do good" among the Dutch, particularly in "reforming the Sabbath." *Young's Chronicles*, p. 381. A final compelling motive was "a great hope and inward zeal they had of laying some good foundation, or at least to make some way thereunto, for ye propagating and advancing of the Gospel of the kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of ye world; yea, though they should be but even as stepping-stones unto others for ye performing of so great a work." *Bradford, History*, p. 32. Dr. Usher (p. 44) takes no note of this strong missionary impulse, and he introduces motives for removal — e.g., "active controversy as to the validity of their own fundamental conclusions" — of which neither Bradford nor Winslow says anything. Nay, this is the very libel against which Winslow wrote to protest. *Young's Chronicles*, p. 380.

“singular abilities in devine things” did not prevent him from being “very able to give directions in civill affaires, and to foresee dangers and inconveniences; by which means he was very helpfull to their outward estats and so was every way as a commone father unto them” (*History*, p. 25). When the time came for leaving Leyden, Robinson spent “a good part of the day” in preaching from Ezra 8 2. The rest of the time was given to prayer — though according to Winslow, space was found for a feast in the pastor’s house furnished by those remaining behind for those about to sail. The date was Thursday, July 20, 1620. Next day all (or most) went by canal to Delfshaven (twenty-four miles away), where the *Speedwell* lay ready. “That night was spent with little sleep by the most, but with friendly entertainment and Christian discourse and other real expressions of true Christian love” (*History*, p. 73). On Saturday, July 22, “the wind being fair, they who were to sail went aboard and their friends with them.”<sup>37</sup> When at last the tide called those who were not going to leave the ship, “their Reverend Pastor falling down on his knees (and they all with him) with watery cheeks commended them with most fervent prayers to the Lord and his blessing. And then with mutual embraces and many tears they took their leaves one of another, which proved to be the last leave to many of them” (*History*, p. 73).

Robinson stayed with the majority at Leyden,<sup>38</sup> by desire and decision of the church, but much against his own inclination. He longed for the opportunity of reunion, and hoped it would come soon. Individuals of the Leyden remnant went over from time to time. In 1627 many went. His own turn never came. It was not so much the lack of means that hindered as the opposition of certain persons

<sup>37</sup> Winslow says, “We only going aboard” i.e., those about to sail. Young’s *Chronicles*, p. 384.

<sup>38</sup> “But take notice — the difference of number was not great.” Winslow, Young’s *Chronicles*, p. 384.

in England, whom he calls the "forward preachers." These "of all others" — he wrote to Brewster, December 20, 1623 — "are unwilling I should be transported, especially such of them as have an eye that way themselves; as thinking if I come ther, thee market will be mard in many regards" (*History*, p. 199). On the 19th of the same month, in a letter to Bradford, he speaks of the comfort there would be in a talk face to face; "but seeing that cannot be done, we shall always long after you and love you and waite God's apoynted hour. . . . My wife with me re-salute you and yours. Unto him who is ye same to his in all places and nere to them which are farr from one another I commend you and all with you." In April, 1626, the two leaders heard of Robinson's death from a letter written by Roger White, his brother-in-law, and dated Leyden, April 28, 1625. He had died on March 1. His illness began on Saturday evening, February 22. Nevertheless, next day he preached twice. In the days of the week following he grew weaker, but felt no pain. "He was sensible to the very last, and his friends came freely to him. . . . If either prayers, tears, or means would have saved his life, he had not gone hence."<sup>39</sup> His loss, indeed, seemed irreparable. Looking backward from a later time, Bradford wrote that "though they esteemed him highly whilst he lived and laboured amongst them, yet much more after his death, when they came to feele ye wante of his help and saw (by woeful experience) what a treasure they had lost, to ye greefe of their harts and wounding of their sowls; yea, such a loss as they saw could not be repaired" (*History*, p. 25). Some were inclined to think that his death, occurring "even as fruit falleth before it is ripe,

<sup>39</sup> He was buried in St. Peter's on March 4, many university professors and other eminent citizens being present. The church register shows that nine florins were paid for opening the grave. This sum was customary "for burials between the ordinary hours of 12 M. and 1.30 P.M." See Dexter, E. H. P., p. 592. But cf. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 3d series. Vol. IX, 1846. *Memoirs of the Pilgrims of New England*, pp. 55, 56, by George Sumner.

when neither length of days nor infirmity of body did seem to call for his end," should be taken, for some reason, as a sign of the divine anger.<sup>40</sup> At any rate, he passed just when the Leyden section of the church was about to stand most in need of him.<sup>41</sup> This will appear if we glance at the way in which his mind in relation to the matter of Separation had developed.

## V

Dr. Usher says that "Robinson's opinions changed from year to year" (p. 192); and implies that his position at any given time is, therefore, difficult to define. It is a reckless statement. He was the very opposite of John Smith in this respect. Substantially he stood at the end of his course where he stood at its outset — I mean that he still maintained the necessity of separating from the corrupt worship and government of the English Church, and of gathering true believers into a true church-estate. But truth was more to him than consistency. Whether we have his exact words or not in the Farewell Address ascribed to him by Winslow, it is certain that we have his meaning. "He charged us before God and his blessed angels to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of his, to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry; for he was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to break

<sup>40</sup> Letter of Thomas Blossom to Governor Bradford, Leyden, December 15, 1625. Young's *Chronicles*, pp. 480-483.

<sup>41</sup> Of Robinson's six children (John, Bridget, Isaac, Mercey, Fear, and James), one was buried in St. Peter's, Leyden, on February 7, 1621, and another on March 27, 1623, which of them, does not appear. Bridget was married at Leyden in May, 1629, to John Grynwich, student of theology, and her mother attended as a witness. Isaac went to New England in 1631, and was still living in 1702 — aged 92. Mrs. Robinson "is recorded as in Leyden as late as April 6, 1646, and Hoornbeeck states that she and her children, "joined the Dutch church." E. H. P., pp. 591, 592 and Arber, p. 160. There is no good foundation for the Robinson New England pedigree as made out by Dr. Allen. Vol. I, pp. lxxv ff., Ashton. Mrs. Robinson's will, dated Leyden, 1692, has been found.



forth out of his holy word.”<sup>42</sup> His growth toward wider vision was the reward of this attitude.

At first he had no doubt of the absolutely anti-Christian character of the English Church. In his earliest writing entitled *An Answer to a Censorious Epistle* (by Dr. Joseph Hall), 1609, he will not admit that the English Church is in any point “the Temple of God compiled and built of spiritually hewn and lively stones, and of the cedars, firs, and thyme trees of Lebanon,” but, on the contrary, is “a confused heap of dead and defiled and polluted stones, and of all rubbish of briars and brambles of the wilderness, for the most part fitter for burning than building.” It is, therefore, intolerable; and “we take ourselves rather bound to shew our obedience in departing from it than our valour in purging it, and to follow the prophet’s counsel in flying out of Babylon ‘as he-goats before the flock,’ Jeremiah 50 8.” To the like effect he wrote, but more elaborately, in his *Justification of Separation*, 1610. There is no hint of compromise at this stage. He can see nothing to admire or even endure, in the English “State-ecclesiastical.” His invective is worthy of Henry Barrow — whose arguments, indeed, he often repeats.

On February 25, 1610–11, Dr. William Ames wrote to Robinson a brief letter on the question, “Whether there be not a visible communion out of the visible Church.” In other words, is not evident Christian character a sufficient reason for fellowship with a person? The implication is that Robinson denied this, and made it a condition of fellowship not merely that the person should be a member of some visible church but also a member of the true church. Ames rightly describes this as the “very bitterness of Separation,” and urges Robinson to reconsideration. Surely, he pleads, there “can be no other sufficient reason why we should communicate with visible churches but only because we visibly

<sup>42</sup> Young’s Chronicles, Winslow’s Brief Narration, p. 397.

discern that they have communion with Christ." If Christ owns a person inside or outside a visible church, are you to refuse him, or a church so far as it visibly contains the like of him? Robinson, in a belated reply, showed himself not yet able to appreciate so simply Christian a principle. He is still fettered by the formal logic of Separatism. "External communion is a matter of external relation and order, under which men out of the church are not." For example, Christians outside the church may pray together though it is their duty to come inside; but for members of the church to pray with non-members or with members of a false church is a breach of church order and relation (*vitium ordinis et relationis*). Thus the effect of church membership was a deplorable narrowing of Christian fellowship. But by 1614 when he published the treatise *Of Religious Communion, Private and Public*, his view as regards the former has broadened. He has come to see the distinction there is between personal and church actions. He sees that private communion is a personal action which need not infringe "any set order of any church." He sees further that in a subconscious sort of way he has always been of that persuasion, but that a vehement desire of peace, together with some weakness, has deterred him from making his mind quite clear to himself. Now, however, his mind is clear and his will resolute on the point. He is prepared to practise and defend private communion with all visible Christians to the fullest extent possible (p. 65).

But for a man who cherished the desire "to learn further or better what the will of God is" (p. 103), this could not be the end. There was bound to be a further enlargement of insight and tolerance. When, therefore, such a question as the "lawfulness" of occasional attendance at the services of the English Church for the purpose of hearing the Word was thrown up by the course of events, Robinson was at no loss for the right answer. It is signifi-

cant that the question was thrown up in Henry Jacob's church, Southwark, London, for Jacob (1563-1624) was a liberal spirit. Some of his people had felt no scruple in going now and then to a parish church. On this account they were disowned by a majority, including the teacher, and a young woman who did not at once leave off the practice was excommunicated. Two of the liberal minority, on going over to Leyden, were welcomed by the church there as a matter of course. But on being transferred later to Amsterdam, a small violent party prevailed to get one or both of them cast out. Both sides in both churches appealed to Leyden — the one in protest, the other in self-defence. Robinson (for himself and his people) wrote a letter to each and made it clear that his approval went entirely to those of a generous spirit and against those whose spirit was the reverse. As to the "Ancient Church" at Amsterdam he denounced a judgment of withering severity.

In the same year, 1624, he wrote a treatise on the subject,<sup>43</sup> stating and reasoning the case with his wonted thoroughness and fairness. The concluding paragraph sums up his final attitude. While reiterating an unchanged conviction that he "cannot communicate with or submit unto the [English] church-order and ordinances there established, either in state or act, without being condemned of mine own heart, and therein provoking God, who is greater than my heart, to condemn me much more," nevertheless he can say, "For myself, thus I believe with my heart before God, and profess with my tongue, and have before the world, that I have one and the same faith,

<sup>43</sup> The treatise was found in his study after his death, and held back for ten years because it was perceived that "some, though not many, were contrary-minded to the author's judgment." Then it was published in hope of staying the mischief wrought in the church by four or five men, particularly one, whose obstinate insistence on the same narrow course as Robinson condemned had recently rent the church and even reduced it to a fifth of its former numerical strength. The church still lingered in 1639 and even in 1647. Dexter, E. H. P., p. 593, note. But its members were all gradually absorbed by the Dutch churches or dispersed.

hope, spirit, baptism, and Lord, which I had in the Church of England and none other; that I esteem so many in that Church of what State or Order soever, as are truly partakers of that faith, as I account many thousands to be, for my Christian brethren, and myself a fellow-member with them of that one mystical body and Christ scattered far and wide throughout the world; that I have always in spirit and affection all Christian fellowship and communion with them, and am most ready, in all outward actions and exercises of religion, lawful and lawfully done, to express the same."

## VI

Thus, by 1620, Robinson had risen above mere "negation." It was not of Separation that his mind was full but of communion, as far as might be. Hence the character of his last words to those who in that year were setting forth on their Great Adventure. They were not to go as Separatists, or Brownists, still less as Robinsonians, but as children of light, under the guidance of a living spirit who had already revealed to them a measure of truth, and would reveal yet more if they were faithful to His word. This was the principle — a positive, not a negative, principle — which inspired the Pilgrim movement. On the whole, the men and women who bore it in their hearts to the New World remained true to its impulse, and so bore in them, notwithstanding many temporary failures, the seeds of that comprehensive progress in Church and State, which has been a characteristic feature of the American people. Expressed in terms of the Church it meant that all its members (to use the accepted phrase) were Prophets, Priests, and Kings. In other words, all had direct access to God; all were privileged to learn and speak forth his will; all might be endued with his conquering power. So the Church was a spiritual democracy; and when the men who formed it turned to the task of con-



stituting a political State, inevitably they proceeded on democratic lines. Nor was it strange if, at the same time, they conceived Church and State to be, in like manner, a theocracy, for both alike were to be ruled by God's law. It was in respect of this Divine law — its seat and scope and interpretation — that the Church went astray, and for a time led the State astray. By ascribing to the Scriptures an absolute authority for all things pertaining to the conduct of life, whatever its sphere, the Pilgrims put an embargo on freedom of thought and action. But they were not singular in this. They were only singular inasmuch as they applied the rule of scriptural authority more thoroughly than other Puritans or Protestants. And they were more thorough in applying Scripture because their eye was more single. To believe in anything as a word of God was for them but the first step to obedience. And so unwittingly, they were on the way to that higher standpoint of the modern Christian mind which seeks to sift the chaff from the wheat in the Scriptures *just because of its loyalty to the word of God, and its vision that the word of God cannot be inconsistent with any word of truth.*

In short, the positive principle of unreserved loyalty to the known will of God, on which the Pilgrims based their covenant, was a vital principle out of which in due course, was bound to come the light to see and the power to transcend whatever hindered the normal growth of the church or the individual. And if this was the principle which Robinson's men were the first to plant in the New World, then plainly Dr. Usher is wrong when he speaks of them as "choosing the wilderness because it seemed impossible to find anywhere in England or Holland a body of people who *thought exactly as they did.*"<sup>44</sup> "They maintained unflinchingly at Plymouth an ideal which had long ceased to have a numerous following in England." Hence their "lack of numerical growth at Plymouth." More than its

<sup>44</sup> Italics mine.

isolated position or its economic drawbacks, the ecclesiastical exclusiveness of Plymouth was the "secret" of its failure to grow. They stood for "a negation, nothing more than an uncompromising hostility to the established Church of England and to the ordination of Bishops" (p. 188).<sup>45</sup> Thus the Pilgrims were isolated — one might even say boycotted — because of their exclusiveness. And, proceeds Dr. Usher, "nowhere does this isolation . . . reveal itself more clearly than in their difficulties in finding a minister" (p. 189).

Here at last is a point we can test. His only reference is to the mission of Allerton to England in 1626-27, where "he was to find a clergyman, but experienced such difficulties . . . that he finally brought back with him a man who soon gave clear proof of insanity." Turning to Bradford's account of Allerton's mission we find no mention of any mandate "to find a clergyman"; but we do find that when Allerton arrived with one in 1628 he was severely taken to task for his presumption.<sup>46</sup> In fact, there is not the least proof that the Pilgrims ever went in search of a minister or were "nonplussed" (Usher, p. 190) to find one. So long as Brewster and Bradford lived, they were content with their "ministry of the word," though sorry to miss the sacraments. They were glad of a regular pastor when he could be had, and, if worthy, paid him all due deference. But their church theory did not require him, except for the *bene esse* of a church. The *esse* consisted of the people, and there was nothing of principle to prevent them ordaining Brewster, Bradford, or any other of their

<sup>45</sup> Cf. p. 193, "So far as they [the Pilgrims] could discover after 1630, there was not in all England one man of real ability who believed as they did, nor were there any laymen of real ability who came to Plymouth in any number to strengthen the Pilgrim State."

<sup>46</sup> Not 1626 or 1627 — "This year (1628) Mr. Allerton brought over a young man for a minister to the people here, *whether upon his own head or at the motion of some friends there*" (italics mine) "*I well know not, but was without the Church's sending.* . . . His name was Mr. Rogers, but they perceived upon some trial that he was crazed in his brain. Mr. Allerton was much blamed." History, p. 292.

number to the pastorate. If they looked outside for one, it can only have been from a sense of their own insufficient training.

Passing by some other misconceptions,<sup>47</sup> I will mention what I take to be the greatest — viz., that the Pilgrims and the Puritans who “come to New England in 1630 and after” were sharply antagonistic to each other in their relation to the English Church (Usher, p. 186). For what is the fact? In parting from his friends at Delfshaven, Robinson had said, “There will be no difference between the unconformable ministers and you when they come to the practice of the ordinances *out of the kingdom*.”<sup>48</sup> And so it came to pass. When the first Puritan colonists came to Salem in 1629 they came with a prejudice against the Plymouth Church. It was supposed to be an embodiment of Brownism. But a few weeks sufficed to change their mind. On May 11, Governor Endicott wrote to Bradford a letter of thanks for the service of the Plymouth doctor and deacon, Mr. Fuller, and to say how much he rejoices to have been satisfied by him, “touching your judgments of the outward form of God’s worship. It is, as far as I can gather, no other than is warranted by the evidence of truth and the same which I have professed and maintained ever since the Lord in mercy revealed himself unto me; being far from the common report that hath been spread of you touching that particular.”<sup>49</sup>

This was not mere compliment, for on July 20, the Salem Puritans proceeded to choose a pastor and teacher in a manner nowise different from the Plymouth way —

<sup>47</sup> Thus, we are told that “we have comparatively few reliable indications” of “Pilgrim belief aside from church government” (p. 93), although we know that their theology was Calvinistic, and that they “assented wholly to the 39 Articles and no less to the public confession of Faith put forth by the French Reformed Churches,” see Arber, pp. 289, 294. Stranger still, we are told that “we have no authentic hint” as to whether they knelt to receive (the Lord’s Supper) “or sat” (p. 197); although the idea of them kneeling is unthinkable.

<sup>48</sup> Young’s Chronicles, Winslow’s Brief Narrative, p. 398 and note.

<sup>49</sup> History, pp. 317, 318.

the pastor being Mr. Skelton and the teacher Mr. Higginson, both of whom by submitting to reordination virtually gave up their status in the English Church. Then on August 6, there was a choice and ordaining of elders and deacons, and on this occasion, delegates from Plymouth, including Governor Bradford, were present. Delayed by "crosswinds" they arrived late, but came "into the assembly afterward and gave them the right hand of fellowship, wishing all prosperity and blessed success unto such good beginnings." What happened to this first company happened also to the second which came over in the spring of 1630 led by John Winthrop.<sup>50</sup> So with later companies — though it may be going too far to take it for literal truth "that the rest of the churches in New England came at first to them at Plimoth to crave their direction in church courses and made them their Pattern."<sup>51</sup> It was, indeed, not a case of taking the Plymouth church for a "pattern." There were, from the first, features in the Bay churches more or less peculiar to themselves.<sup>52</sup> But the point is that *so far as the Plymouth Church was Separatist, they too became Separatist* and were moved in that direction rather than deterred by the Plymouth example. Thus not repulsion but convergence is found between the Pilgrims and the main body of the Puritans "who came to New England in 1630 and after" (Usher, p. 186).

And there was convergence because the new comers were at last free to follow the impulse which lay at the heart of Puritanism and had been followed by the Pilgrims all along.<sup>53</sup> Bradford (quoting John Cotton) means

<sup>50</sup> For particulars, see Dexter, C., p. 416.

<sup>51</sup> So W. Rathband in his *Briefe Narration of Some Church Courses*. This was said to him by Mr. W(inslow)?, an eminent man in the church at Plymouth in 1644, and is repeated by Robert Baillie in *A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time*, 1645 (p. 54).

<sup>52</sup> The Plymouth church, e.g., had no "teacher" and its idea of what belonged to the function of ruling elder was different.

<sup>53</sup> Perhaps the most striking instance of this is John Cotton who before leaving old Boston heard with "grief" and "wonder" of the Puritan decline to Separatist ways in New England, but took to them himself when he got there in 1633. Dexter, C., p. 422.



this when he says, "there was no agreement" (of the two parties) "by any Solemn or common consultation, but it is true they did, as if they had agreed by the same spirit of truth and unity, set up by the help of Christ the same model of churches, one like to another; and if they of Plymouth have helped any of the first comers in their theory, by hearing and discerning their practices, therein the Scripture is fulfilled that the kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven which a woman took."<sup>54</sup> I may restate this important point by saying that the Pilgrims and the immigrant Puritans were able to meet each other half way inasmuch as the former, under the guidance of Robinson, had learned to relax their extreme emphasis on Separation while the latter were driven to become Separatist, notwithstanding their boast of unity with the mother-church, under the influence of a new environment acting upon the inner logic of their creed. And if this be so, then we must say that another view put forward by Mr. Champlin Burrage (*Early English Dissenters*, vol. I, chap. 14), requires considerable qualification. His view is somewhat difficult to summarize; but he seems to maintain that the Puritans went out thinking themselves to be still a part of the English Church. And this may be granted — though the thought was a product of sentiment rather than of understanding. He seems to maintain, again, that they were, at the same time, already Puritan Independents of a presbyterian type. And this also may be granted — though this fact, if they were conscious of it, ought to have suggested to them the absurdity of talking, as some did, of a merely "local secession" from the church. He maintains further that, with the passing years, and even by 1650, the practically congregational, but presbyterianized, churches established by the Puritans had so reacted upon the Plymouth church as to make it "more and more like them." And this too may be granted to some ex-

<sup>54</sup> Young's Chronicles, Governor Bradford's Dialogue, p. 426.

tent—though the Presbyterian element is hardly traceable down to the death of “the good elder Mr. Thomas Cushman” on December 11, 1691.<sup>55</sup> But when Mr. Burrage maintains that “the early Puritan congregations were principally, if not wholly, organized after their own ideals, and owed little or nothing to the Plymouth church, whose “influence was evidently infinitesimal,” he is wrong. For he can maintain this only on the assumption, which he appears to make, that the Plymouth church was still rigidly Separatist. This is the assumption of Dr. Usher, and, as I have pointed out, is contrary to the evidence.

There is one respect in which the Pilgrims, whatever else they may have yielded to the increasing dominance of the Puritans, did not yield without a struggle, if at all.<sup>56</sup> Robinson in one of his essays (the seventh) argues for civil tolerance of error, “considering that neither God is pleased with unwilling worshippers, nor Christian societies bettered nor the persons themselves neither, but the plain contrary in all three . . . and to that of the Father (Augustine) — ‘that many who at first serve God by compulsion come after to serve him freely and willingly’ — I answer, that neither good intents nor events, which are casual, can justify unreasonable violence, and withal, that by this course of compulsion many become atheists, hypocrites, and familists, and being at first constrained to practise against conscience, lose all conscience afterwards. Bags and vessels overstrained break, and will never after hold anything.”

This Christian wisdom of their beloved pastor was not forgotten by those who had known him, and by them, by their leaders especially, the spirit of it became a tradition

<sup>55</sup> He was more than a ruling elder in the presbyterian sense: “it being a profound principle of this Church, in their first formation . . . to choose none for ruling elders but such as were able to teach; which ability (as Mr. Robinson observes in one of his letters) other reformed churches did not require in their ruling elders.” *An Account of the Church of Christ in Plymouth*, by John Cotton, p. 49. Cushman had held office for forty-two years and had been practically pastor for ten or more.

<sup>56</sup> During the first two generations probably not at all.

of the church. Severity exercised, after much patience, towards hypocrites and knaves like Oldham, Lyford, and Morton was no departure from it. Nor is there any proof that difference of religious opinion or practice was visited with harsh treatment unless it issued in conduct dangerous to the common welfare. It would be unfair to expect from even the most charitable of the seventeenth century the same liberal view of supposed heresy and the same degree of leniency we have learned to hold and practise. But judged by the prevailing standard of their age, and, still more, by the example of their Puritan neighbors, the Pilgrims can be seen to have sustained a level of self-restraint in their relation to dissidents which does them honour.

The worst trial arose with the incursion of Quakers in 1656. They "much infested the country between the years 1650 and 1660, and proved very troublesome, and subverted many. The church of Plymouth, in particular, was much endangered by them — several of them wavering and trembling, but only one family wholly led astray." But "it may be observed to the honour of the colony that though the provocation of the Quakers was equally great here as elsewhere, yet they never made any sanguinary or capital laws against that sect as some of the colonies did" (Cotton's *Account of the Plymouth Church*, p. 118 and note).

For the most part this is true — though it is also true that even Plymouth caught fire from the prevailing fierceness and assented to measures unworthy of a noble past.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> There were no Quakers in New England before 1656. The first move toward persecution sprang from the General Court of Massachusetts. At its instance the Commissioners of the United Colonies issued circular letters to the General Court of each colony recommending certain action. Thus in 1658 it was recommended that "members of this cursed sect," "male or female," (1) should be banished under pain of severe corporal punishment; (2) should be punished accordingly if they returned and be banished again, under pain of death; (3) should accordingly suffer death if still they came back — "except they do then and there plainly and publicly renounce their said cursed opinions and devilish tenets." All the colonies agreed, including Plymouth. But in the

But there were those of the Pilgrim churches (for by this time the one had become several) who held by it, and it is a fitting close to mention that one of these was Isaac,<sup>58</sup> John Robinson's son, who let himself be disfranchised rather than be a party to persecution.

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NOTE. — Dr. Whitley (in edition of John Smyth's works, Preface, pp. vii, viii) puts forth the startling suggestion that because — according to Morton Dexter — but seventeen of the Pilgrims hailed from Scrooby against thirty-two from Norfolk, the scene of Robinson's activity, the main source of the Pilgrim church has so far been unrecognized; and further that, because most of the emigrants from the North adhered to Smyth, "all the wealth of learning accumulated by Brown, Arber, Dexter, etc., is really introductory not so much to Robinson's story as to Smyth's." Is it not enough to point out by way of answer,

1. That, as a matter of fact, the core of the Leyden church was drawn from Scrooby; and that it was the Leyden church which initiated the pilgrimage to New England.
2. That this fact is not affected by the question how many joined Robinson at Leyden from Norfolk, even if we grant, what is not proved, that these were "mostly" his "relations and connections" — fruit of a problematical Norfolk ministry. Is there any evidence of a Norfolk ministry apart from that in Norwich?
3. That Smith and his group cannot in any real sense be spoken of as Pilgrim Fathers, since the movement they represent drained itself away in Holland. The name can be applied with fitness only to the one or two, like Francis Jessop, who finally joined the Leydenites.

Plymouth Colony, Thomas Hatherly, Captain Cudworth, Isaac Robinson, and some others suffered disfranchisement or "their place in the Government," sooner than consent. Deprived of its nobler element the Court of Plymouth colony passed many laws of great severity but none involving the death penalty. See *History of Scituate*, pp. 47-57, by Samuel Deane, Boston, 1831.

<sup>58</sup> At this time (1656) he was forty-six years of age and had been twenty-five years in the colony.



## ABBREVIATIONS

- Arber, *S.P.F.* . . . . . Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, 1887.  
 Bradford, *History* . . . . . History of "Plimoth Plantation," ed. 1910.  
 Brown, *P.E.* . . . . . The Pilgrims of New England, 1897.  
 Burgess, *Smith* . . . . . John Smith and the Pilgrim Fathers, 1911.  
 Burrage, *N.F.* . . . . . New Facts concerning John Robinson, 1913.  
 Burrage, *E.E.D.* . . . . . Early English Dissenters, 1912.  
 Dexter, *C.* . . . . . Congregationalism as seen in its Literature, 1879.  
 Dexter, *E.H.P.* . . . . . England and Holland of the Puritans, 1906.  
 Hunter, *Collections* . . . . . Collections concerning the Early History of the Founders of New Plymouth, 1849.  
 Hunter, *Collections* . . . . . Second Edition, enlarged, 1854.  
 Usher, *P. and H.* . . . . . The Pilgrims and their History, 1918.  
 Whitley, *J.S.* . . . . . Works of John Smyth, 2 vols., 1915.

BOOK REVIEWS

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HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. GEORGE FOOT MOORE. Vol. II: Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. xv, 552. \$3.00.

With well-timed entrance upon the stage this second volume of Professor Moore's history is synchronous with the reappearance of the first volume in a second edition, an honor of which it was well deserving and which will doubtless come also to its successor. It is six years since the earlier work was noticed in this Review. The author, being as it were more at home in the province now under consideration, has in the reviewer's opinion here surpassed himself; his second volume is distinctly better even than the first. One walks one's own field more securely and works it with truer understanding, perhaps in all senses more happily. As a succinct exposition of the three religions represented, this volume is worthy of high praise. So far as the reviewer is competent to express an opinion, it is as sound in judgment as it is accurate in details. He has even the feeling that the author's style has improved, possibly in lightness of touch, in the course of the half-dozen years since the first volume came out, although one may find a sentence of no less than one hundred and one words, the reputed significance of the number doubtless having escaped the attention of the learned author, who would not otherwise have devoted this particular number of words to the opening paragraph of his chapter on Christianity!

One reason why this volume is excellent is that it treats of only three religions in five hundred pages as compared with nine religions discussed in the six hundred pages of its predecessor. The author is thus able to do justice to his themes, and one wishes only that he had been permitted to give a whole volume to each of the three. As it is, a fair proportion of his book is devoted to Judaism, a somewhat longer exposition covers Mohammedanism, and these two together do not take quite so much space as does Christianity, to which rather more than half the book is dedicated. Albeit Professor Moore has been so generous to the most important religion of the three, one cannot but lament that, especially in this field, he has been forced to confine himself within the bounds of the 280 pages he has allotted to Christianity. One gets the impression often that he had more to say than he has said, and the reader must regret that anything has been omitted.

Professor Moore, who believes that nothing can be learned about a religion "from ignorance and superstition," has not only in his *His-*

*tory of Religions* ignored all lower and middle-class religions, such as those of Peru and northern Europe, but has naturally sacrificed in his account of the selected religions which he discusses those elements which make the foundation of the higher faith. So in Judaism a few general remarks dispose of the remote nomadic phase, and no time at all is lost in discussing the kind of cattle in which the tribes were interested, whence these tribes originally derived, or whether their god was at first the moon, a storm-god, or a tree-spirit. The author is obviously more interested in higher things than legends and surer things than theories. Enough to say that Jehovah (Professor Moore retains this form) was the god who fought for the Israelites and had his seat on some mountain, as contrasted with the local Baals, proprietors of fields and cities. A dozen pages thus sweep the reader on to the prophets, whose ideals are embodied in the institution of Deuteronomy. Here one feels inclined to ask, Which prophets? And at this point, despite the circumscribed space, one would have liked to see a distinction made between the various types of prophets, not only in the stereotyped sundering of the prophet of hope and prophet of love, but between the classes of prophets, those who relied on visions and those who did not, the prototype and the later imitator. Some estimate too of their relative value might have been given, and an answer to the modern question whether the prophets represent spiritual or ethical awakening. Jeremiah, the greatest of all the prophets, deserves at least a posthumous appreciation.

The author in speaking of the Law of Holiness says that the notion of sin as defilement is purely sacerdotal, the most heinous sin to the priestly mind being defilement of holy objects and profanation of the Holy Name. But one does not have to wait for the development of a sacerdotalism to find this attitude; it is inherent in all forms of taboo, and some African savages are as fearful of profaning holy names as were the Jews. Ezekiel represents not advance but retrogression. Monotheism, it is well emphasized by the author, not only differs from monolatry but, among the Jews, owes its being to the conception of history as a moral order; it was not the result of philosophical speculation. The origin of the Pentateuch is sketched briefly, so briefly that an unversed reader would hardly realize its historical background. Perhaps some of the space later expended on the brilliant mediæval scholars might have been utilized to make clearer the component parts of the Old Testament. The historical "strands," though mentioned, are left rather twisted. This may be due to the fact that the author regards purely literary questions as beyond his present mark. But this is not so in the case of "Isaiah," in respect of whom it is

religiously of moment whether (but the author does not touch the topic) he represents a single, duplicate, or triplicate personality. A short and sufficient analysis disposes of the stories of creation, paradise, the deluge, and dispersion of nations as "Hebrew mythology," which found literary expression from the ninth century till the Persian time. Literary dependence on Babylon, in the author's view, is suggested by the story of the flood but not by the story of creation. Jewish eschatology, he opines, was developed into a definite scheme under Persian and (or) Orphic influence, but its premisses are to be found "in the religion itself." One would like to see this thesis stated more definitely. The religion itself scarcely seems to have any eschatology save that of ghosts and graves. Sheol is hardly a premiss of heaven.

The closing chapters of Judaism, discussing mediæval and modern Judaism, are introduced by an account of the protestant Karaites, and then present in masterly fashion a summary of Jewish mediæval scholarship with its galaxy of learned men, such as Saadia, Maimonides, and Mendelssohn. Zionism and its prospects are also included in the general subject of Judaism.

In his account of Islam the author tells us that most prevalent opinions about Islam are wrong, and that, for example, contrary to common belief, the prohibitory laws of the Moslem religion have proved as ineffective as have modern Christian experiments. The Eighteenth Amendment is probably not referred to in this remark; but while it is true that, as Professor Moore states, the intemperance of the Bagdad caliphate clings to later Mohammedan literature and a single verse of the Koran has certainly not made all Mohammedans abstainers, yet the verse and later insistence upon it have had in general a far deeper effect than any Christian mandate. One needs only to contrast the abstemiousness of the Moslem world in India with the self-indulgence of Christians there, not to speak of Hindus, to realize that prevalent opinion in this regard, while it exaggerates, is not wholly wrong.

Professor Moore thinks that Sufism was affected not only by Greek and Christian influences but also by Buddhism; that Fanâ is a form of Nirvana. This, though the latest theory, is by no means certain. It would be safer to say that some form of Fanâ (there are various forms) seems to derive from India. According to Havell, who has lately demonstrated how poor a historian a good artist can be, the only question as to the influence of Buddhism on Mohammedanism is whether the Prophet himself belonged to the Hīna or to the Mahāyāna! Professor Moore very properly ignores this absurd theory. He



mentions here, rightly to repudiate it, another opinion formerly prevalent but incorrect, that Sufi pantheism was an Aryan (Persian) reaction against the hard Semitic deism of Mohammedan theology. Another "erroneous notion" is that Moslem law is wholly derived from the Koran. This notion is due to a failure to distinguish between civil and religious law.

In "Christianity" Professor Moore has given an unbiased history of the Church, admirable for its objective presentation, fairness, and fulness of detail; less admirable, if with all respect one may so express it, for its careful reticence. It is, however, seldom that one writes a history of Christianity without saying anything to offend anybody, and that alone is a notable achievement. Yet what the reviewer has in mind can be illustrated by the course of the author's history of Jesus. The story, as told by Professor Moore, repeats in abbreviated, one might almost say expurgated form, the Gospel narrative, expanded occasionally by a scholarly aside ("his mother-tongue was the Aramaic vernacular of Galilee"). But there is no intimation that Jesus is reported to have performed any other miracles than those of healing (including expulsion of demons). There is only a deferred and remote hint (by means of a reference to pages in the preceding volume) that the resurrection story is one of a type of resurrection stories. The history of Jesus himself stops short with the crucifixion. This same attitude of silence is maintained through the history of the Church. The ridicule heaped upon Calvin by his own brethren is ignored. In regard to Calvin's part in burning Servetus it is merely said that "when the Genevans burned him" and the Inquisition burned his books, the heresy of Servetus was ended. This, to be sure, is history so far as it goes. Jesus is said to have performed miracles of healing and "the Genevans" burned Servetus. But there seems to be something lacking to completeness. Thus, too, in another matter, it is not even hinted that the Quakers in England and America made themselves a public nuisance and offended decency, but they are charitably (and truly) described as anti-formalists pervaded by a soul of mysticism. Their honesty, simplicity, and philanthropy are apparently the only traits preserved by history. It is not in reference to them or to any other Christian sect that the general observation is made, "Antinomianism is, indeed, inherent in all mysticism."

In regard to the influence of Paul, Professor Moore holds that the main current of Christian thought did not take its rise in him and did not even pass through him: "Rather it flowed by him as around a rock in the bed of a stream." Thus, so to speak, Peter was the rock on which the Church was built and Paul the rock on which it split.

This review cannot do justice to the acumen and erudition with which the work of the Church in its monastic and mediæval phases is presented, the admirable account of the Protestant Reformation, with the added chapter on the Catholic Reformation, and the clear analysis of the hair-splitting symbols which for generations intrigued the bellicose metaphysicians who thought themselves Christians. If the volume as a whole has any defect, it is the one already noticed. The generous desire to bring into light only the unimpeachable side has here and there led to the picture becoming slightly out of focus. The weaker aspects of Christianity, its fables, superstitions, tragedies, indecencies, no one wishes to see emphasized, but they should not be passed over without a word. Discreet reticence has its place in an apologia rather than in a history. Professor Moore has told the truth about Christianity but not the whole truth, and this is a pity because his work is likely to be popular in those institutions where devout minds that turn with horror from "radical" writers need enlightenment from a source they are bound to respect.

As with the preceding volume, the author has added a well-selected bibliography and (a point rarely noticed in reviews) his index is a real index.

EDWARD WASHBURN HOPKINS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

A GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. JAMES H. MOULTON. Vol. II. Accidence and Word-Formation. Part I. General Introduction; Sounds and Writing. Ed. by W. F. HOWARD. T. & T. Clark. 1919. Pp. 114. 7s.

The first volume or *Prolegomena* of this grammar was published in 1906, and quickly won recognition as a new departure in the field. The MS. for the second volume was about two-thirds finished ten years later at the time of the author's tragic death. This first installment of it is an earnest that it will be completed and published to the satisfaction and service of New Testament scholars. The subjects with which it deals do not generally secure as much interest as do the matters of syntax treated in the earlier volume. But even the comment on sounds and writing presented in this section is made readable by the easy style of the author and by the interest of his evidence from the papyri. Besides, Professor Moulton did not construe his duty as a grammarian to be the cataloguing of all linguistic phenomena, but merely the elaboration of those questions on which new light is needed or is available.

Fortunately also the author has returned again in an Introductory Chapter to reconsider in the light of recent discussions the language of the New Testament writers, in particular their contact with literary language and their Semitic coloring. The last of these sections will especially interest American scholars on account of the present trend of criticism in this country, as will the special appendix on the same subject by the Rev. C. L. Bedale, which is promised for the last part of the volume.

HENRY J. CADBURY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE JESUS PROBLEM. A RESTATEMENT OF THE MYTH THEORY. J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P. Watts & Co., London. 1917. Pp. vii, 264. 5s.

Convinced that Jesus is a purely mythical figure, Mr. Robertson undertakes the ambitious task of presenting "a defensible historical view" of Christian origins to supplant the "mythical narrative of beginnings" contained in the New Testament. Modern critical study upon the Gospels is said to have ended in complete failure. Order can be introduced into the chaos only by recognizing that these documents are a mere tissue of myth. Hence the real problem for the historian is simply to propound a suitable theory regarding the rise of the alleged myth. When approached from this angle Christianity is found to have sprung from a pre-Christian Jesus-cult in which the celebration of a crucifixion and the eating of a sacramental meal were central. The crucified victim in the myth is supposed to have been called "Son of the Father," a title which is equated with Barabbas (Bar-Abbas). The occurrence of "Jesus Barabbas" in some manuscripts of Matt. 27 16 convinces our author that originally Jesus (i.e., Joshua, "Saviour") and Barabbas were rival hero-divinities of the same type. Therefore "the hypothesis forced upon us by the whole history, then, is that there had subsisted in Jewry, in original connection with a sacrificial rite of Jesus the Son of the Father, a sacrament of a Hero-God Jesus, whose Name was strong to save" (p. 81). By the year 70 A.D. the cult had become sufficiently distinctive to initiate a definite propaganda in competition with the rest of Judaism. Its relatively rapid growth is credited primarily to the superior efficiency of its organization. Its earliest literary document was the Didache, an adaptation of an older Jewish work. In the course of time fictitious Epistles and Gospels were produced in support of the practices and teachings of the cult. All the New Testament books belong in this class, except perhaps the Epistles of James and Jude. They alone have even the semblance of genuineness.

The position of those who deny the historicity of Jesus has not been materially strengthened by Mr. Robertson's book. It presents no new data of importance and it follows in general the line of argument commonly employed by representatives of this school. The early Christian writings still extant in the New Testament are set aside without any effort to test their reliability by the application of a modern scientific historical criticism. In place of constructive data drawn from these substantial documents readers are offered a congeries of "inferably" and "manifestly," supported by only intangible evidence often of more than dubious worth and derived from sources that have no actual historical connection with early Christianity.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

#### BOOKS ON BABYLONIA AND ITS RELATION TO WESTERN ASIA:

THE EMPIRE OF THE AMORITES. ALBERT T. CLAY. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. VI. Researches. The Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 192.

RECORDS FROM UR AND LARSA DATED IN THE LARSA DYNASTY. ETTALENE M. GRICE, Ph.D. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. V. Babylonian Texts. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 56. Plates LXXXVIII.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE LARSA DYNASTY. ETTALENE M. GRICE, Ph.D. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. IV, 1. Researches. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 43.

In 1909 Professor A. T. Clay issued *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites*, in which he maintained that our whole conception of the cultural relations of western Asia must be changed. The commonly accepted view that the Semitic peoples had their home in the Arabian peninsula from which they spread over the more fertile countries to the east, north, and west, he held to be entirely erroneous. Not only did he maintain in that volume that Israel's culture was not of Babylonian origin, but on the contrary that the culture of Semitic Babylonia either originated in the west or had a long period of development there before it was carried into Babylonia. In other words he maintained that the dissemination of the northern Semitic peoples did not move from the east to the west, but from the west to the east. Now, ten years later, he issues another volume whose avowed purpose is to assemble all the facts that bear upon the history and religion of the western Semites, to substantiate further the claims made for the great antiquity of the Amorites, to show that Ur of the Chaldees was the capital of the Amorite empire, and to demonstrate that the generally accepted theory of the Arabian origin of the Semites is utterly baseless.



With acumen and learning Professor Clay assembles evidence from inscriptions scattered over the whole of western Asia, and conjures up the vision of a great Amorite or western Semitic empire, which he believes extended from the southern portion of the middle Euphrates on the east to northern Syria and the Gulf of Akabah on the west, an empire which immediately preceded Hittite ascendancy, having existed in the third, fourth, and fifth millenniums B.C. He maintains that it was a political unity, in which country and capital had the same name, and with this hypothesis in mind he searches for the center from which it was governed. This he finds in the middle Euphrates kingdom of Mari, or Mara of the earlier inscriptions. The city Mari was, according to Professor Clay, "powerful enough to weld together the Semitic peoples of this region into a great nation and give it the name Amurru"; it was the home of the Chaldean antediluvian mythological kings, at whose head stands Aloras; it was the home of the Biblical patriarch Abraham, for, according to St. Stephen (Acts 7 2, 4), Ur of the Chaldees was in Mesopotamia. The hegemony of Mari or Ur he believes to have been established long before the time of Sargon and to have been brought to an end by Hammurabi.

Evidence for the existence of this empire, its history, and its civilization is sought in the influence which it exerted upon other peoples as revealed in the names of countries, cities, temples, deities, and persons. For example, in the names of the antediluvian patriarchs preserved by Berossus he finds Amorite name-elements and in five or six of them the name of the Amorite deity Uru. It may be remarked in passing that he considers the Babylonian and Hebrew lists of antediluvian patriarchs as having nothing in common except the fact that each list consists of ten names and the tenth is the diluvian hero. The inference that Amurru furnished Babylonia with its early inhabitants rests upon Sumerian and Akkadian inscriptions, in which it is difficult at the present state of our knowledge, and frequently quite impossible, to distinguish with certainty between Sumerian and Semitic names. This difficulty is not minimized by Professor Clay; but the fact that a name is written in Sumerian he does not regard as proof that its pronunciation was Sumerian. Hence he is able to regard most of the names of the earliest kings of Kish, Erech, and Ur as Semitic, or more specifically west Semitic or Amorite. The fact that the name of the fifth king of Erech, Gish-bil-ga-mesh (Gilgamesh) contains "mash" or "mesh" as a name-element serves in his opinion to identify the Gilgamesh epic with the Lebanon district. Ea-bani or Enkidu he regards as an Amorite; the cedar forest which surrounded the stronghold of Humbaba he locates with "reasonable certainty"

in the Lebanon mountains instead of in Elam; the mountain Mashu he identifies with Mount Hermon; and Humbaba himself he regards as the earliest Amorite known by name. That the Gilgamesh epic had its origin in the west follows necessarily if the above premises could be regarded as substantiated. Professor Clay has long contended that the names of the rulers of the dynasty of Isin show that they were Amorites, and the complete list of the kings of Larsa which has been recently recovered and published by Professor Clay leads to the same conclusion. It is now generally conceded that the rulers of Isin, Larsa, and the first dynasty of Babylon gained their place as the result of a great racial movement which brought western Semites down the Euphrates and into southern Babylonia. Professor Clay's contention that Assyria received its Semitic population at about this same time as an offshoot of the eastward movement of Amorites is gaining general assent. The business and legal documents found in Cappadocia written in a Semitic language and in the cuneiform script are believed by some to be of Assyrian and by others of Babylonian origin. Professor Clay regards most of the proper names in these Cappadocian tablets as Amoritic, but he does not venture to suggest to what extent western Semites moved into Asia Minor. Neither is he able to assert that the Amorites influenced Egypt politically in the early period; but he calls attention to the Semitic loan-words which were introduced into Egypt at the same time that the western Semitic dynasties were establishing themselves in southern Babylonia, and suggests that it is possible that one or more dark periods in Egyptian history are to be explained by encroachments of Amorites.

Since the Amorites left no written records, knowledge of their language is dependent upon a study of personal names preserved in the inscriptions of neighboring peoples. This has convinced Professor Clay that the Amorite language was the parent language of Semitic Babylonian, Aramean, Hebrew, and possibly Arabic. He also maintains that they had a script of their own, which was used upon perishable material. He argues that had they used the Babylonian cuneiform script for writing their Amorite language, as the Hittites, Mitannians, and Vannic people did for their languages, excavations would have yielded some evidence of it — although excavations have not been conducted in the land of the Amorites except in Palestine. In the writer's opinion he might have strengthened his argument for the early appearance of a western Semitic system of writing by referring to the report of Wen-Amon <sup>1</sup> (ca. 1100 B.C.) concerning his journey to

<sup>1</sup> See Breasted, *History of Egypt* (1905), pp. 213-218, and Kittel's discussion in his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*. I, 178.

Byblos, by reference to the fact that Cyprus and Crete had their own system of writing, and that the ostraca from Samaria show that writing in Palestine had a long history before 900 B.C.

A further means by which Professor Clay seeks to substantiate the thesis of the antiquity of Amorite civilization is in claiming that the prehistoric legends which the western Semites and Babylonians had in common originated in the west and that the worship of western gods spread over a wide area but exerted its chief influence upon the Babylonian pantheon. It has long been suspected that such gods as Adad and Dagan are of west Semitic origin; but Anu, Ashur, Ishtar, Ea, Enlil, Marduk, Nabu, Nergal, Nin-IB or Inurta, Shamash, Sin, and many others are likewise claimed for the west, until "it is of course apparent that the trend of what precedes is toward regarding practically everything that is Semitic Babylonian as having its origin in Amurru."

Professor Clay believes that there is no evidence in favor of the theory generally accepted by scholars that Arabia is the center from which the Semitic dispersion occurred. He declines to discuss the hypothesis of the ultimate origin of the Semitic race as being a problem which belongs to anthropology, and chooses rather to confine himself to historical and archæological data and traditions. He points out that Hebrew tradition regards Mesopotamia as the cradle of mankind, and Armenia, the country in which the ark rested, as the second home of the race. The tenth and eleventh chapters of Genesis show that it was the view of the biblical writer that the Arabian nations emanated from the north, and "their opportunity for knowing at least something about the early history of the Arameans — that is, their own ancient history — was at least greater than that enjoyed by those modern scholars who begin the history of Abram and the Hebrews with the exodus of the Arameans from Arabia, or even Egypt, in the latter half of the second millennium B.C." Although he recognizes that the burden of proof rests with those who maintain that the Semitic dispersion occurred from Arabia as its center, his argument against the theory is based chiefly on the following considerations: (a) If in ancient times water was more abundant in Arabia than at present, one can readily understand how tribes with great flocks would pass into it from the north. (b) An examination of the names of gods in Arabic inscriptions and of personal names throughout the Semitic field ought, *ex hypothesi*, to show Arabic influence, which he finds not to be the case. (c) The fact that the Arabic language preserves the characteristics of Semitic speech more fully than other Semitic tongues is taken to indicate that this migration from

the north into Arabia took place before the modifications which differentiate the various Semitic languages from each other had occurred. He concludes therefore that our present knowledge is insufficient for the formation of any theory in regard to the original seat of the Semites.

The present writer is unable to accept many of the conclusions arrived at by Professor Clay. Some of them he himself puts forth as tentative and subject to revision; many are ingenious, and all will stimulate thought and discussion. Doubtless cautious scholars will feel that he has carried his theory much too far, although it is becoming increasingly clear as additional facts are brought to light from excavations that the west influenced the east at an earlier period and more constantly than has been supposed hitherto, and that the cultural relations of the whole of western Asia were more complicated than was formerly deemed possible.

Dr. Grice's publication of the cuneiform text of two hundred and fifty-three tablets of the Yale Babylonian Collection, accompanied by an introduction and the usual indexes, is an imposing volume. About half of the tablets were found at Muqayyar, the site of Ur, and are the "first considerable number to be published from that site." The remainder are from Senkereh, which is the site of the ancient city of Larsa, the biblical Ellasar. They are legal contracts and temple records, written for the most part in the Sumerian language, their chief importance being due to the historical matter contained in the date formulae. To mention the fact that Miss Grice is an apt pupil of so able an editor of cuneiform texts as Professor Clay is sufficient assurance that the text is a faithful and skillful reproduction of the original. A perusal of the list of personal names might at first give the impression that the inhabitants of southern Babylonia at that time all bore Semitic names; but cross references show that names are to some extent listed under both the Sumerian and the Semitic forms. Tested by a page taken at random from the index, the references are found to be reliable with only an occasional error. It is unfortunate that it is not the fashion to give the figures on the seal impressions of dated tablets, for they are valuable in indicating the style of seal used at the time the document was written, the seal impression being contemporaneous with the writing. Neither time nor pains have been spared in getting out a large piece of work which is exceedingly well executed.

From date-formulae of texts published in the above mentioned volume, from unpublished texts of the Yale Collection, and from other texts previously published, Miss Grice had collected and arranged



chronologically all of the facts known in regard to the dynasty of Larsa. Just as her work was nearly completed she received an advance copy from M. Thureau-Dangin of a prism in the Louvre containing the date-formulæ of the Larsa dynasty. She had the satisfaction of seeing conclusions at which she had previously and independently arrived confirmed by this new and unimpeachable evidence, but it was no longer necessary to publish the entire study. Since Yale texts furnish some additional material for the restitution of broken formulæ and of the middle portion of the prism covering a period of fifty-four years, she has published "the part of that study which comprises a list of all the formulæ of the dynasty that are known, so arranged that they may be conveniently used by scholars who are using the Larsa Dynasty material."

Her explanation of the difficult phrase *šàg-mu ki-18* as a reference to the duration of the long conflict which raged between Rim-Sin and the army of Isin, is both clever and reasonable. A comparison of the transliteration of the date formulæ of the Louvre prism by M. Thureau-Dangin with that of Miss Grice emphasizes the need of a uniform system of transliteration which shall be followed by all scholars. Miss Grice's excellent study of the chronology of the Larsa dynasty is indispensable to any one working in that period.

MARY I. HUSSEY.

MT. HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

THE PEOPLE'S FAITH IN THE TIME OF WYCLIF. BERNARD LORD MANNING.  
Cambridge University Press (England). 1919. Pp. 155. 2s. 6d.

This little book belies its appearance, which is that of the ordinary prize essay published in a university. At best one may expect that such productions contain a certain amount of information collected with or without method, and perhaps a useful bibliography. But Mr. Manning's book is more than this; it is a real contribution of ideas by a thoughtful man. It may be paid the compliment of hostile criticism by those who are unable to accept its conclusions, which is a high commendation for a young scholar to deserve. The merit of a good style, relieved by terse and epigrammatic utterances, adds to the attractiveness of the book, the object of which is to let the popular writers of the age of Wyclif give their testimony as to the religious condition of England at the time. Mr. Manning wisely declines to begin with a pretentious bibliography, containing much that has been written and little that has been read. He prefers to speak of his "List

of Books," of which he says: "It is intended to serve one purpose only — to elucidate the footnotes. It is not a catalogue of books consulted, nor the beginning of a bibliography."

His chief authorities in verse are *Piers Plowman*, Gower, the *Lay Folk's Mass Book*, Robert Brunne's *Handlyng Synne*, and John Myre's *Instructions for Parish Priests*. Most of the minor works are easily accessible, being published by the Early English Tract Society. The prose works of which most use has been made are La Tour Landry, Richard Rolle, Julian of Norwich, Wyclif, Grandisson's Register, and above all the interesting dialogue of *Dives and Pauper*, printed by Pynson in 1493. It is from this last named that Mr. Manning has drawn much of his inspiration. He considers that it is an argument between Dives, a man of Lollard or Wyclifite views, with the orthodox Pauper; and in answer to the objections of Dives our author sees a wise and temperate defense of the orthodox doctrine of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with a singular absence of any desire to justify the abuses which had crept into the Church. Indeed, as Mr. Manning himself pointed out in a magazine article,<sup>1</sup> the argument was rather in favor of Pauper than of Dives, whose "protestantism" had nothing constructive about it.

The mediæval church was a marvelous organization, consistent in its aims, its doctrine, and its practice. Its influence permeated the entire population of western Christendom; men, women, and children felt its power as it bore upon every phase of human life. By the time of Wyclif Latin Christianity in England ruled with the prestige and experience of many centuries. The difficulty of today is to look back on this age so remote from us with an impartial eye. It is easy to contrast the merits of our age with the defects of a superstitious one; equally easy is it to regard the days when Christianity ruled through its priests as a halcyon period in which religion triumphed and the world was glad. The difficulty is to enter into the true historic spirit, to study the evidence impartially, and to endeavor to visit the past by its aid as an intelligent traveler does a strange country. That Mr. Manning can accomplish this difficult feat redounds to his credit.

Mediæval religion, as he points out, was neither the religion of a book nor that of family influence. The Christianity inculcated was taught by word of mouth and by appeals to the senses was constantly before the eye. The priest or friar, not the mother, was the first instructor of youth. The Mass, for example, appealed not to the intellect but to the emotion. The worshiper understood little but was taught to feel much. He was given prayers to be used independently

<sup>1</sup> Churchman's Magazine, 1915.

of the service, "admirable" — to quote our author — "for their simple piety. No one could fail to understand them, and the popular religion which they represented cannot be dismissed as a superstition unintelligible even to those who professed it." And he goes on to say, "Not the minutest event in Christ's passion but was commemorated there. From an art symbolism had been transformed into a science. Every faculty of man, every property of nature, had been captured and subdued for that supreme drama of worship." But though he can write thus, Mr. Manning is not blind to the fact that gross superstition was encouraged by the clergy in the interests of the Church. "The Church," he says, "sanctioned any belief, however preposterous, if it tended to exalt the power of the Mass, the dignity of the Host, or the consequence of the priest. . . . To increase the offerings of the devout they were told that a penny offered at Mass would secure an increase of worldly wealth as well as free one from his sins." It is interesting also to note that the sacrament of Extreme Unction was unpopular, because it was a general belief that, if by any chance the recipient should not die, he would have to lead an almost monastic life — an opinion which more than one synod repudiated.

The idea that the observance of Sunday as the Jewish Sabbath was a Puritan innovation is completely dispelled. Till the Lollards began to exalt Sunday as a scriptural festival above others, the tendency was to insist on its sanctity. Sunday traveling was discouraged. Even preachers must beware lest "undre colour of prechying" they were not "to moche about in veyne in the Sunday." Indeed what in England is called "the Continental Sunday" was as abhorrent to the clergy of the fifteenth as to those of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Perhaps the most thoughtful chapter in the book is "The Problem of Free Will." Augustinianism found little favor in the popular religion inculcated by the priests, who rather taught that men could "work out their own salvation." But then came the Black Death, which forced men in their despair to embrace a sort of fatalism. But even Wyclif resisted the doctrine that some men are predestined to damnation, and would not allow to the "elect" the comfortable belief that their salvation was assured.

The conclusion is a really powerful bit of writing and shows the influence of the great modern tradition of the Cambridge school of mediæval historians, of which Maitland was the founder. If the author is spared to do more work on the line on which he has happily begun, he may be the bearer of the torch which Maitland lighted and handed on to Figgis. His last paragraph may justify his claim to seize it:

"The battle with rigid Protestantism and the final discomfiture of the enlightened rationalists a hundred years ago were the necessary preliminaries to the rediscovery of the Middle Ages; but the memory of these historic struggles does not justify the appropriation of mediæval religion by any modern party or the repudiation of it by any other. For the mediæval Church is the mother of us all."

F. J. FOAKES JACKSON.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

IDEALISM AND THE MODERN AGE. GEORGE P. ADAMS. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. ix, 253. \$2.50.

Professor Adams finds that modern democracy needs correction by a religious attitude, a devotion to certain objective ideals quite in the Platonic spirit. The gospel of self-assertion, which in our day has led to the extremes of capitalism and pragmatism, should be replaced by the ideal of the "Great Community." For democracy is the doctrine of the "will to power," the apotheosis of "activity and control," "the conscious conviction that the only social order fit for man to live in is one which he himself has made and can control — and which he can unmake if he so desires. This conviction is but democracy come to a full consciousness of its meaning and its power" (p. 7). On the other hand, "Idealism in philosophy *should* connote a wide understanding of and a generous sympathy for the forces — primarily those of common life and labor — which are rapidly gathering strength to challenge the arbitrary 'will to power' lying at the root of so much within the established order" (p. viii). In fact, by democracy Dr. Adams understands a more or less Nietzschean individualism, and by idealism a belief in the social organism — interpretations which seem decidedly questionable when we remember that Germany stood for the former, that current democracy particularly emphasizes the needs of "common life and labor," and that the founder of idealism did not believe in the social organism. Yet though it is not democracy but self-assertiveness that he is arraigning, he does sincerely and properly attempt to restore a lost balance; and allowing for his strange misuse of terms, we must heartily commend the enterprise.

Religion and idealism, if not one and the same, are for our author closely allied. "At its source religion is the felt participation of the individual in a collective consciousness. . . . The vehicle of group emotion, the source and stuff of that which was sacred and supernatural, was no personal god or spirit, but . . . a 'social force trembling on the verge of Godhead'" (p. 51). And Platonism, with its contemplation of the eternal ideas, is "the spokesman for something



which can only go by the name of religion" (p. 11). Over against these Dr. Adams arrays the present-day naturalism, with its Darwinian struggle for existence, its scientific control of nature, its world "to be controlled, to be made and remade . . . in order that our active human interests and impulses shall find release and satisfaction" (p. 10). Tracing the growth of this democratic spirit, he finds it characterized by increasing emphasis on business for its own sake and mechanical efficiency, and by a decreasing valuation of personality. "Democracy, economic rationalism, science, . . . bid us incessantly create, make our world, and all the objects of value which it shall contain" (p. 87). "Behaviorism and pragmatic instrumentalism are philosophies of an age which no longer has significant structures to possess, to contemplate and to enjoy. . . . Pragmatism is the intellectual form of modern capitalism" (p. 112). The subjectivism of modern philosophy, from Kant on, marks the same accentuation of man's activity. "The Kantian insight sums up a world of activity and democracy" (p. 163). Dr. Adams, true to the Platonic tradition, is an epistemological realist. "Consciousness of reality is as much inalienable and elemental as is consciousness of self" (p. 123). The subjective philosophies have but a subjective origin; the economic interpretation of history is only the reflection of the economic bias of the present age (pp. 136, 137). Not only does pragmatism rest upon a realistic basis, to wit, the science of biology, but if pragmatism is true, "there is no intrinsic meaning or value possessed by any one period of time in its own right" (p. 174). "Childhood is not only a precursor and a means to the attainment of adult life. Childhood has its own interests" (p. 175). *"Every behavior interest is surrounded by a cognitive fringe. . . . It is this cognitive . . . fringe, and not the behavior, . . . which is the source of all the meaning which attaches to an object attended and responded to"* (p. 186).

But though democracy is faulty enough, we cannot abandon it. We must look forward to a combination of it with religion and idealism. "And such a . . . type of order surely is to be found nowhere except in . . . a community, a social and spiritual order" (p. 219). True, no doubt, but uninforming; the real question is, how shall we construct this community? Is it to be republican, monarchic, socialistic, or what? Unfortunately, we are not told. And is religion anything more than fervent social reconstruction? Dr. Adams says little if anything about God, the spirits, or aught but the "social problem." Religion is not allowed even a practical quality; it "will always bungle when it competes with the intelligent and the scientific control of life-processes and their environment" (p. 223). What is left but enthusi-

asm for the future social organism, such as might be shared by any atheistic socialist?

Thus after all, our author has not been able to move out of the magic circle of the subjective. The great Platonic idea of the community — what is it but the epitome of the needs of man, such as all pragmatists desire? No objective principles or ideals except this are mentioned; almost all of the book is concerned with epistemological controversy. Yet though he does not specify them, it is a good sign that he hints of ideals to be followed in the making of the perfect society, that he would right the over-balanced cultivation of activity, and that he defends, if in little more than name, the fundamental importance of religion for human progress.

Dr. Adams' diction is rather obscure, and his paragraphs as a rule lack unity. A Platonist should not use nouns as adjectives: e.g., "idea system," "knowledge situation," "behavior interest," etc. Nor should he employ the barbarous "due to" when he means "on account of" (p. 29). Examples, too long to quote here, of English which is no less than slovenly, are found on pp. 44, 59, 113, 166, 229.

WILMON H. SHELDON.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

THE RELIGION OF NIETZSCHE. NIETZSCHE THE THINKER. A STUDY. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Henry Holt & Co. 1917. Pp. x, 539. \$3.50.

The key to Nietzsche's theory of life, Mr. Salter thinks, is the conflict in his mind between piety and knowledge. "Being by nature and by force of early training reverent, finding, however, his religious faith undermined by science and by critical reflection, his problem came to be, how, consistently with science and the stern facts of life and the world, the old instincts of reverence might still have measurable satisfaction, and life again be lit up with a sense of transcendent things. He was at bottom a religious philosopher."

This observation, though not new, has never before been so clearly put, and with such a nice sense of the fact that whatever system and poise Nietzsche in thought attained rests upon a conflict of emotions that grew deeper and more tragic with the years. Neither of these facts seems, to most commentators upon Nietzsche, to have been of particular importance. They respond to his emotional qualities — the beat and rhythm of his style, the great hunger and dream-like gratifications in his ideas. They violently agree with him or they violently disagree with him, according as he lifts the lid or clamps it

down upon their own subterranean reserves of feeling; they preach him or they denounce him; they do everything but understand him. The fault is not altogether their own. Nietzsche's temperament, method, and style are not such as to evoke understanding. He is the most personal, the most autobiographical and idiosyncratic of the great thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work is more frequently a soliloquy and a challenge than an analysis and an exposition, and his effect upon his readers corresponds. To understand him requires an impersonality, a scientific self-restraint, difficult indeed for those who are in the least sensitive to the subtle and infectious quality of Nietzsche's *élan*. Yet this is very nearly what Mr. Salter has attained. He has written an exposition of Nietzsche's thought without parallel in English, without parallel perhaps in any language, for impartiality, lucidity, and detail. He has done this by attending objectively to the thought of Nietzsche, without obtruding his own reaction upon it. He has classified, arranged, coördinated. Not a remote whimsy in the collection of apothegms and reflections which so largely make up Nietzsche's works but he has studied, appraised, and set under its appropriate concept, not a nuance that he has not caught and fixed.

Withal, the defects of his method can not be separated from its excellences. Intent upon the last things, the endings, dyings-out, realizations, which all thoughts are, of Nietzsche's mental processes, he sets them in the order of their logic and mutual implications which is appropriate to thought. He provides an architectonic of Nietzsche's mind, the most admirable yet to hand. But he does not provide, nor with his method can he provide, the explanation of Nietzsche's mind which his excellent beginning leads the reader to hope for. Very probably he did not intend to do so. Yet the comprehension of Nietzsche involves very much more than the exposition of him, and in a mind like his, thoughts and feelings are so inextricably interwoven that the gain from a genetic approach can hardly be estimated. Behind Nietzsche's thought, motivating and finding self-fulfillment in it, lie not only the conflict of his temperamental and nurtural piety with his mature knowledge, but the whole aggregate of conflicts that made up his diathesis. The entire history of his life is one of disease, of pain, of unremitting strain of body and mind and of the struggle to conquer them. His change in attitude toward existence and its conditions, his break with the Schopenhaurian system, with Wagner, his bitter denunciations of the great mass-movements of his own time, are all implicated in the alterations of his attitude toward his own existence and his own problem. That absorbed him, as it must have absorbed any man, and its heart and vitals were the mastery of pain.

It is this that makes of Nietzsche a religious philosopher, even though — indeed through the very act — he stands what is customarily called religion on its head. But if he stands it on its head, it is not because he differs with the tradition regarding its ultimate end. He agrees regarding its ultimate end. He differs with regard to its tools and means. For Nietzsche is no cosmological philosopher. He is not concerned with analyzing the world into its elements, with understanding its nature and laws. He has no scientific curiosity, and his spirit is one of assertion, not of inquiry. He is bitterly and tragically concerned with that wherewith all religionists more smugly concern themselves. He is concerned with Salvation, and his system, no less than the Christian system, is a system of Salvation. But where Christianity saves *from* sin and pain and evil, Nietzscheanism saves *in* sin and pain and evil. His system is postulated on making his weakness his strength, on the power of self-mastery, self-transcendence, through self-affirmation. Now escape from self is the aim of all religions of disillusion, whether Asiatic or European. But the escape is a self-negation, a suicide, not a self-affirmation. It is escape through denial. In his early philosophizing Nietzsche accepted this way of escape. Indeed, he experienced it in his own life, and he got corroboration of it from his classical studies and his philosophical discipleship. He followed Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer taught the will and the self-destruction of the will in idea, particularly in idea as art and as religion. In these the will comes to rest from its unhappy strain and turmoil of existence; in these it loses itself in the quietude of non-existence. And such non-existence is the goal of being. Hence man's discipline, Schopenhauer deduced, should be one of relaxation in the struggle for life, of self-surrender, and thus of self-transcendence and salvation. Unreligious though this doctrine seemed, it breathed the esoteric spirit of Christianity, and for a time Nietzsche found repose in it. But for a time only. The pain which opposed itself like a charged wire fence against his every impulse, shut him in and kept him prisoner. His every effort to get beyond it intensified it, and his every labor was not merely an achievement in itself but a mastery over pain. His life, in a word, was not an escape from and assuagement of pain, but an increase and a wrestling with it, like Israel's with the Lord. Such growth as he had attained, came in pain and through pain, and after a time he came to see it as the sole condition of life and achievement, came indeed to have something of a masochistic preference for it, and to see salvation not beyond it but within it.



This realization was of course primarily emotional, not intellectual. But it got rationalized, inasmuch as his feeling sucked into its vortex the substance of all the knowledge which his mind touched, and made of it an aid and a comfort. The knowledge was derived particularly from the world of classical philology and, in a much less degree, from evolutionary science. The modern industrial and economic world he could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and he had a certain emotional blindness to its implications which rendered it irrelevant to him. Indeed, there has rarely been a man of so profound and widespread an influence with so complete an obliviousness to the realities of his time.

But the very emotional blindness which rendered him oblivious on the one side, made him acutely perceptive and original on many others. It enabled his "transvaluation of all values," his postulation of the Superman, his vivid and biting analysis of the "decadence" of Europe. Truth disappeared for him; knowledge became a matter of "vital lies"; morality a question of continental health or of the lack of it; the history of philosophy the history of a misunderstanding of the body; salvation ceased to be vicarious and became a process of painful, self-affirming self-transcendence, ending in an unknown goal — the Superman — and the unknown goal became a substitute for the known God. God, for Nietzsche, died, and his own life became that of an agonist, if we may trust Andreas Salomé, of "emotion over the death of God." The good of life was to be found in an inversion of all things the dead God had been the symbol of — in the repudiation of society, of "morality," of all that relaxation of danger and vigilance which had turned men into a herd and God into a shepherd. Whereas men had anciently been lords, and God an ideal of isolated Epicurean autonomy and self-sufficiency, they are today weaklings and slaves and God is an indulgent master. The future yearns to something deeper, more vital, more tragic, and altogether unprevisible; not the serene divinity of the ancients, but the agonized divinity of the unborn. Says Zarathustra, "Once when men looked on the far-stretching sea, they said God; but I teach you to say, Superman." And since he taught the Superman, who is salvation, he taught also the life which attains to salvation. That life is tragedy and transition. Man is no resting-place but a bridge; as the ape is to man, a reproach and a burning shame, so man is to the Superman. The true duty of man, the right morality, is a duty and morality of pain and struggle, of self-transcendence by pain, of power by self-transcendence. Against the "decadent" and "slavish" "Love thy neighbor as thyself," Nietzsche sets the power-generating "Destroy thyself and the neigh-

bor as thyself," so that the unknown Superman, better than both, may come to be.

That this is an idealism without precedent or parallel can hardly be denied. Nor can it be denied that it is a religious idealism, having its source in the same motives and conditions, autobiographical and social, which the more orthodox religious derive from and gratify. To a large extent it is a simple contradiction of tradition, amplified and given the semblance of reasonableness by a more or less relevant assemblage of observations from history and culture. To this extent it may be dismissed as an idiosyncratic instance of a type of thinking I have elsewhere had occasion to describe as compensatory—i. e., as the mind's projection in idea, in imagination, of a world or system that makes good the felt insufficiencies of reality; a compensation for the shortcomings of reality. And how Nietzsche's philosophy of self-sufficiency was compensatory to his dependent, invalid's life, he who runs may read. In another dimension, however, in the dimension of the dialectic of values, Nietzsche has brought a unique gift to the treasure house of philosophy. He has to some degree exemplified and has powerfully preached a doctrine that envisages an ignored great residue of human life. He has done this out of a love of excellence which led him to the joyous acceptance of the most arduous and cruel of its conditions; he has done this, seeking to spread a firmer pedestal for a perfection, devotion to which is the more remarkable in that it is the most transhuman and undefined perfection which human idealism records. Nietzsche's philosophy is thus a religious philosophy with a vengeance.

H. M. KALLEN.

NEW YORK.

THE IDEA OF IMMORTALITY, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE. The Baird Lecture. 1917. GEORGE GALLOWAY. T. & T. Clark, 1919. Pp. viii, 234.

IMMORTALITY, AN ESSAY IN DISCOVERY, COÖRDINATING SCIENTIFIC, PSYCHICAL, AND BIBLICAL RESEARCH. B. H. STREETER and Others. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xiv, 380. \$2.25.

THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN INQUIRY. SAMUEL MCCOMB. Dodd, Mead & Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 240. \$1.50.

Of the many recent books on Immortality, testifying pathetically to the interest in the subject awakened by the tragedy of the war, Dr. Galloway's is the most deliberate, and is likely to prove of most enduring value. "On God and Godlike men we build our trust" is his unannounced text. Science reveals in the world a principle of organization, which, in man, philosophy recognizes as the soul, al-

though at this point the author's thought is highly speculative in character (reminding one of the theological doctrine of the impersonal Logos) and confused in statement. Within the soul arise commanding ideals of justice and perfection, which are not fully realized on the level of this world and hence call for a transcendent world of life and progress which theism alone can assure. If there be a God, the source and guarantee of moral values, then personality, wherein alone such values inhere, becomes supremely precious and individual immortality certain. This follows, however, only if God be conceived of as transcendently personal instead of pantheistically immanent; but such a thought of God is given by Christianity and in religious experience. Only in man's faith in God can his hope of immortality be securely rooted.

It should be evident, although in fact it seems not to be, even to Dr. Galloway, that this argument outflanks the chief obstacle to belief in immortality, which is, of course, the complete dependence within our experience of psychical life upon physical structure. Yet, unless we think of God as having a physical substratum (and who does so think of Him nowadays?), those who believe in Him affirm the actual existence of psychical apart from physical being and thus deny the necessity and the universality of the connection. Accordingly, faith in a spiritual God opens wide the door to hope of human immortality. Since this is not always clearly seen and since there are those who appear to find immortality more credible than theism, those who advocate immortality devote much space to attempts at the removal of the psycho-physical obstacle. One of the most interesting is in the book by Streeter and others, entitled *Immortality*, which contains nine essays of very uneven merit, all of which, however, accept to a greater or less degree the genuineness of the phenomena dealt with by the Psychic Research Society and explain them by the hypothesis of telepathy and the operations of the subliminal mind. Of these essays, the second is by J. A. Hadfield, Surgeon in the Royal Navy, who discusses from the point of view of a surgeon and with professional knowledge the relations between mind and brain; arguing that the progressive emancipation of the former from the latter in the history of development indicates the possibility of its survival when the connection shall be completely broken by physical death. That is to say, the facts of psychic research are interpreted as evidence of extraordinary mental powers, natural to man but as yet only partially developed and in a few individuals, which demonstrate the ability of the mind even here to transcend physical limitations and so promise survival after death.



If, however, the psychical phenomena to which Mr. Streeter and his collaborators refer are indeed genuine, may they not be accounted for in another way and regarded as proofs of the survival after death of those who thus seek to manifest their discarnate existence? This is the view of Dr. McComb, whose book is more popular (in a good sense) than either of the others just mentioned. It presents skillfully and persuasively the arguments commonly urged, but rests the case mainly upon what are deemed the assured results of psychic research. This is the line taken by many recent writers — Lodge, Hyslop, Hill, Doyle, to mention only a few. It seems to depend very largely upon one's habitual temper and attitude of mind whether he gives more credence to isolated psychical phenomena or to considerations based upon the significance of God and Godlike men.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

#### SHORT NOTICES

A BOOK ABOUT THE ENGLISH BIBLE. JOSIAH H. PENNIMAN, Ph.D., LL.D. (Religion, Science, and Literature Series.) The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 444. \$2.25.

These lectures to the students of the University of Pennsylvania must have discouraged intelligent interest in the Bible. They show, to the man who is growing away from the traditional attitude towards the Bible, hardly a trace of modern biblical study — the newer theory of the composition of the Pentateuch is not mentioned — and at the same time they do not present the traditional attitude with the glow which alone can give it attraction. The best they do is to furnish a brief summary of the contents of each book of the Bible, and an account of the different English Versions.

THE BOOK OF GENESIS. A JEWISH INTERPRETATION. JULIAN MORGENSTERN. Published by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Cincinnati. 1919. Pp. x, 335.

This is a manual for teachers, tracing many of the stories of Genesis back to early folk-tales, giving expository notes on the text, with illustrations of oriental life taken often from the monuments; reverent in treatment; as to the results of modern study, limited; so far as it goes, intelligent.

WHAT DID JESUS TEACH? FRANK R. GRAYES. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 195. \$1.75.

The Christian Associations of the University of Pennsylvania recently organized a campaign to induce two thousand students to



read during Lent the life of Jesus, as given in its simplest form in the Gospel of St. Mark. Seventy-two groups, composed of Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and numerous other forms of belief, with some self-styled agnostics, met once a week for discussion. The campaign was thought to have been a conspicuous success.

This book embodies the studies which were followed. It is clear in thought, swift in style, reverent, modern in scholarship, necessarily passing over many grave problems, but excellent as a text-book for thoughtful minds, whether in college groups, Sunday schools, or in individual study. There is much valuable material and stimulus in condensed form.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

